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I. Introduction
Congress often enacts tax laws in order to affect people’s behavior in one 
way or another.  However, tax legislation frequently produces outcomes that 
Congress may neither foresee nor desire.  This article describes how the 
temporary cut in the tax on corporate dividends has produced just such an 
unanticipated outcome.1  The law was promoted as a way to reduce undesirable 
tax planning by corporations.2 However, it has also created an opportunity for 
the rich to improperly avoid tax when they work for a corporation they also own 
and control.   
An individual who owns and works for a corporation has at least two 
ways to access the earnings of the business.  As a shareholder, he can access the 
earnings by receiving a dividend on his stock.  Alternatively, as an employee, he 
can withdraw earnings in the form of compensation, such as a salary or bonus.  
Before the cut in the tax on dividends, such an employee-shareholder almost 
always had an incentive to access the earnings as compensation.  However, the 
cut in the dividend tax reversed the incentives for many employee-shareholders.  
There is now a substantial economic incentive for high income employee-
shareholders to substitute dividends for the compensation they would have 
otherwise paid themselves.  Ironically, certain rich individuals can get richer by 
working for free. 
Although the cut in the dividend tax created an incentive for some to 
substitute a dividend for a bonus, the tax cut itself it not the source of the 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law; J.D. Yale Law School; A.B., 
Princeton University.  Thanks are in order for Dorothy Brown, Julie Greenberg, Steve Semeraro, 
Deven Desai, Linda Keller, Anders Kay, and Arne Rosenberg who provided helpful comments 
when this article was in draft form.  This project also received valuable assistance from the work 
of three students:  Amanda Van, Gavin Morrissey, and James Binnal.  Lastly, the project would 
not have been possible without the financial support of the Thomas Jefferson School of Law.
1 See P.L. 108-27, Sec. 301(a)(1).
2 Fact Sheet:  The President’s Proposal to the End of the Double Tax on Corporate 
Earnings,” Office of Public Affairs, Department of Treasury, Jan 14, 2003, KD-3762.  According to 
the release “Corporations will have good reason to pay taxes and not to engage in aggressive tax 
sheltering.  A dollar in taxes saved by a corporation no longer translates into more cash for their 
shareholders.”  Elsewhere, the release stated that the proposal “ .  .  .  will reduce huge distortions 
and inefficiencies, allowing corporations to make decisions based on what makes good business 
sense instead of what makes good tax sense.”  
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problem.  Rather, the tax cut has merely cast a light on the inconsistent and 
problematic way that federal employment tax rules apply to individuals who 
work for a business they also own and control.  Such employee-owners currently 
are subject to a different set of rules depending on the legal form used to operate 
the business.  In addition, if the business operates as a partnership, an employee-
owner’s employment tax liability also depends on whether he is a general 
partner or a limited partner.  To make matters worse, it is not clear what rules 
apply to an employee-owner of a business operated through a limited liability 
company.  
It is widely acknowledged that the employment tax rules should be made 
more clear and consistent.  However, all past proposals for correcting this 
problem have not addressed it in a comprehensive way, focusing instead on 
adjustments that would make the rules apply uniformly only to individuals who 
work for a business they conduct through an entity other than a taxable 
corporation.3  Such business forms generally include partnerships, S corporations 
and limited liability companies.  These proposals are an improvement over the 
current situation.  However, because they fail to address an advantage enjoyed 
by individuals who own and work for a business conducted through a taxable 
corporation, these proposals represent only a partial solution to the problem.
This article will propose a uniform set of employment tax rules that 
should apply to all individuals who work for a business they own and control.  
Before doing so, the article will examine the current rules that determine how the 
earnings of a business are taxed when received by an owner who also works for
the business.  This will require an examination of two sets of rules.  First, there 
are rules that tax the owner’s share of the profits of the business.  Second, there 
are rules that tax amounts paid to the owner as compensation for services 
rendered to the business.  This discussion will reveal how the use of different 
business entities, different ownership interests and different payout forms can 
affect what an employee-owner pays as tax and what he keeps after tax.  The 
article will then describe and critique a widely endorsed proposal for eliminating 
the inconsistencies in the current system of tax rules that apply to employee-
owners of non-taxable business entities.  
Next, the article shows how a shareholder who works for a solely owned 
corporation enjoys a significant opportunity to avoid employment tax that other 
employee-owners do not enjoy.  Among other things, the discussion will 
demonstrate how the temporary dividend tax cut has created an incentive for an 
employee-shareholder to access the earnings of the business by substituting 
dividends for any compensation he would otherwise want to receive in the 
absence of the tax cut.  Moreover, the discussion reveals how this outcome has a 
considerable class bias in two respects.  First, high income individuals are 
3 E.g., Thomas E. Fritz, Flowthrough Entities and the Self-Employment Tax:  Is it Time for 
a Uniform Standard?, 17 Va. Tax Rev. 811 (1998).
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considerably more likely to be in a position to make this tax-saving substitution.  
Second, when they do take advantage of it, these high-income employee-
shareholders save far more tax dollars than their lower income counterparts 
would.  The article concludes by advancing a proposal that would make 
employment tax rules apply uniformly to all individuals who work for a 
business they also own.  
II. Taxation of Business Profits to an Employee-Owner
When an individual works for a business that he also owns, several 
federal laws may apply to extract a tax on the earnings of the business.  The total 
tax extracted will determine how much the employee-owner has left to spend on 
personal items unrelated to the business.  There are two sets of tax rules to 
consider.  First there are income taxes that apply.  These taxes may be imposed 
on the employee-owner, the business, or both.  Second, there are federal 
employment taxes that may also come into play to the extent the earnings of the 
business are treated as the employee-owner’s income from labor.  The following 
sections describe the pertinent aspects of each set of rules.  
A. Income Taxes on the Profits of a Business
State law recognizes several vehicles through which a business can be 
conducted, including the sole proprietorship, various forms of the partnership, 
the limited liability company, and the corporation.  Each business form offers a 
different mix of features that may affect how suitable it may be for any given 
situation and how attractive it may be to the owners of the business.  One factor 
that the owners of any business are likely to consider is the extent to which the 
earnings of the business will be subject to the income tax.  The rules that apply in 
any given situation will depend in the first instance on the state law business 
form used to operate the enterprise.  The state law business form will dictate the 
default tax rules that will govern how the profits of the business are taxed.  
However, in most cases, the business can choose whether it wants an alternative 
set of rules to apply.  
The Internal Revenue Code employs two alternative models for taxing the 
profits of a business.  The first is the corporate model, which treats the business 
entity and its owners as separate and distinct taxpaying units.  As a result, the 
business itself is subject to tax on any profits it makes. 4  In addition, the owners 
are subject to tax on any profits that the business actually pays to them as a 
4 See I.R.C. § 11(a).  Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the “I.R.C.” are 
references to the Internal Revenuee Code of 1986 as amended (title 26 of the United Stated Code). 
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return on their investment.5  The corporate model is the default system of 
taxation that applies when a business operates through a corporation.6
The two-tiered structure embodied by the corporate model stands in 
contrast to the flow through model of taxation.  It does not treat the business 
entity as a taxpaying unit.  Instead, the owners of the business are taxed on their 
share of the profits of the enterprise, whether or not the business actually pays 
any of these profits to them.  The Internal Revenue Code contains several 
versions of the flow-through model of taxation.  This article will address three.7
There are the rules that apply to sole proprietors, there are the rules that apply to 
partnerships, and there are the provisions of subchapter S.  
Federal tax law does not consider a sole proprietor to be a separate 
business entity.8  As a result, any income or loss of the business is merely 
included in the computation of the owner’s individual income tax liability.9  Any 
limited liability company that has only one member is treated as a sole proprietor 
for federal income tax purposes.10  However, such a single member limited 
liability company can choose to be treated as a corporation for federal income tax 
purposes, which would bring the corporate model of tax into play.11 If a 
business operates through a partnership or a limited liability company that has 
more than one owner, the business profits are taxed under the partnership 
version of the flow through model.12  However, any such business has the option 
to be treated as a corporation for federal income tax purposes.13  When this 
option is chosen, the corporate model of taxation applies exclusively.  If a 
corporation meets certain eligibility requirements, it can choose to be subject to 
the flow-through provisions of subchapter S.14
Unless indicated otherwise, the next several sections use the term 
corporation to refer to any business entity (other than an S corporation) that is 
treated as such for federal income tax purposes, regardless of the state law 
business form through which the enterprise is conducted.  Likewise, the article 
uses the term partnership to refer only to those state law partnerships that have 
not elected to be treated as a corporation for federal income tax purposes.  In 
addition, the term limited liability company refers to any such company with 
5 I.R.C. § 61(a)(7).
6 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1).
7 The other versions of the flow-through model address unique industries and situations 
that are of little relevance to the average self-employed individual.  They include the regulated 
investment company rules, the real estate investment trust rules, and rules that apply to estates 
and trusts, common trust funds, and qualified electing funds.  
8 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(2).
9 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(2).
10 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)(ii).
11 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a).
12 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)(i).
13 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a).
14 I.R.C. §§ 1362(a)(1), 1363(a). 
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more than one owner that has not elected to be treated as a corporation for 
federal income tax purposes.  Finally, the term sole proprietor refers to any sole 
proprietor and any single owner limited liability company that has not elected to 
be treated as a corporation for federal income tax purposes.
1. Taxation of the Profits of a Corporation
As a general proposition, there are two separate income taxes that apply 
to the profits of a business conducted through a corporation.  First, the 
corporation itself has to pay an income tax on what it earns.15  Second, a 
shareholder must pay an income tax on any after tax profits that the corporation 
pays to him as a dividend.16 This two-tiered tax structure is one of the hallmarks 
of the U.S. corporate tax scheme.  
The corporate tax applies only to the taxable income of a corporation.17
Taxable income refers generally to revenues, reduced by the firm’s cost of goods 
sold and certain expenses allowed by law.18  Among other things, a corporation 
can deduct amounts paid as compensation to any employee (including an 
employee-owner) for services rendered to the business.19  The principal 
restriction is that the deduction is limited to amounts that are reasonable for the 
services performed.20  Thus, a corporation’s taxable income gets reduced to the 
extent it pays compensation to its employees, resulting in a lower tax bill.
The corporate tax itself is determined under a system of marginal rates
that applies to the corporation’s taxable income.  Under this structure, a 
corporation’s taxable income consists of several different layers of income, each 
of which is taxed at a different rate.  The first layer consists of all income up to 
$50,000, which is taxed at 15 percent.21  The second layer consists of all income 
over $50,000 and up to $75,000, which is taxed at 25 percent.22  Each successive 
layer covers a higher range of taxable income, starting where the preceding layer 
left off.  And the statute prescribes a different rate that applies to each of these 
layers.  The marginal rates range from a low of 15 percent to a high of 39 percent.  
The following table summarizes the range of taxable income covered by each 
layer and the tax rate that applies to each layer.23
Corporate Income Tax Rates
Taxable Income Tax 
15 I.R.C. § 11.
16 I.R.C. § 61(a)(7).
17 See I.R.C. § 11(a).
18 I.R.C. § 63(a).
19 I.R.C. § 162(a).
20 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1).
21 I.R.C. § 11(b)(1)(A).
22 I.R.C. § 11(b)(1)(B).
23 See I.R.C. § 11(b)(1).  
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Over Up to Rate
$0 $50,000 15%
$50,000 $75,000 25%
$75,000 $100,000 34%
$100,000 $335,000 39%
$335,000 $10,000,000 34%
$10,000,000 $15,000,000 35%
$15,000,000 $18,333,333 38%
$18,333,333 unlimited 35%
Thus, if a corporation has $150,000 of taxable income, that income will 
consist of four layers.  The first $50,000 will be taxed at 15 percent, the next 
$25,000 will be taxed at 15 percent, the next $25,000 will be taxed at 34 percent, 
and the last $50,000 will be taxed at 39 percent.
Any profits that remain after the corporate tax has been extracted will be 
subject to tax again if they are paid to the shareholder as a dividend.24  The 
amount the shareholder pays in tax will depend on several factors.  The first 
consideration is the year when the dividends are paid.  Different rules apply 
depending on the year the dividend is paid.
Dividends paid before 2003 and after 2008 are taxed under the same rules 
that apply to all income of the shareholder other than gains from the sale of 
capital assets held for over a year.25  Such ordinary income is subject to tax under 
a system of marginal rates, similar to the system of marginal rates that applies to 
corporations.26  Thus, the tax only applies to the extent the shareholder has 
taxable income.  The taxable income of an individual generally includes all 
income (other than those items that are expressly exempt from tax) reduced by 
any deductions, exclusions and exemptions allowed by law.27  Dividends 
received on corporate stock are included in the computation of taxable income.28
An individual’s taxable income consists of several different layers of 
income, each of which is taxed at a different rate.  The personal income tax 
imposes a set of marginal tax rates that is different from the rates imposed under 
the corporate income tax.  In addition, each marginal rate applies to a different 
range of income depending on an individual’s filing status.  There are four 
categories into which an individual tax return can fall:  Married Individual’s 
Filing a Joint Return, Heads of Households, Unmarried Individuals, and Married 
Individuals Filing a Separate Return.  In each case, the there are six marginal tax 
rates ranging from 10 percent to 35 percent.  The following table summarizes the 
24 I.R.C. § 61(a)(7).
25 Cf. I.R.C. § 1(h).
26 See I.R.C. § 1.
27 See I.R.C. 63.
28 I.R.C. § 61(a)(7).
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six ranges of taxable income and the tax rate that applies to each range in the case 
of married individuals who file a joint return in 2006.29
2006 Income Tax Rates
Married Individuals Filing Jointly
Taxable Income
Over Up to
Tax 
Rate
$0 $15,100 10%
$15,100 $61,300 15%
$61,300 $123,700 25%
$123,700 $188,450 28%
$188,450 $336,550 33%
$336,550 unlimited 35%
Thus, a married couple with $100,000 of combined taxable income in 2006 
will be taxed at 10 percent on the first $15,100.  A 15 percent tax will apply to the 
next $46,200 of taxable income.  And a 25 percent tax will apply to the last 
$38,700 of taxable income.  Those six separate rate categories are in effect through 
2010.  After 2010, the schedule will be replaced with the one that was in effect 
from 1993 to 2000.30 That schedule contained the following five marginal rates:  
15 percent, 28 percent, 31 percent, 36 percent and 39.6 percent.31  There were 
transitory schedules that applied in 2001 and 2002, each one containing six 
marginal rates.  For 2001, the marginal rates were 10 percent, 15 percent, 27.5 
percent, 30.5 percent, 35.5 percent and 39.1 percent.  For 2002, the marginal rages 
were 10 percent, 15 percent, 27 percent, 30 percent, 35 percent and 38.6 percent.32
If a shareholder receives a corporate dividend after 2003 and before 2008, 
the dividend can be taxed in one of two ways, depending on how long the 
shareholder owned the stock in the dividend paying corporation.  If the 
shareholder owned the stock for less than 61 days, the dividend will comprise 
part of the shareholder’s ordinary income, making it subject to tax under the 
marginal rates just described.33  However, in most cases where the shareholder 
owned the stock for at least 61 days, dividends paid on the stock will be taxed at 
the same rate that applies to gains from the sale of stock and other capital assets 
held for over one year.34 That rate varies depending on the top marginal tax rate 
that applies to the shareholder’s ordinary income.  If that rate is 25 percent or 
higher, the dividends are taxed at 15 percent.  If that rate is below 25 percent, the 
dividends are taxed at 5 percent.  
29 I.R.C. § 1(a) as modified by Rev. Proc. 2005-70 to reflect inflation adjustments required 
by law.
30 P.L. 107-16 § 901(a)91); P.L. 108-27, § 107.
31 I.R.C. § 1.
32 I.R.C. § 1(i), as amended by P.L. 108-27, sec. 105(a).
33 Cf. I.R.C. § 1(h)(11)(B)(iii)(I).
34 I.R.C. § 11(h).
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If a shareholder receives a corporate dividend in 2008, the 61-day 
minimum holding still applies to determine whether the dividend will comprise 
part of the shareholder’s ordinary income or if it will be taxed as a long term 
capital gain.  In addition, the tax imposed in the latter situation will still vary 
depending on the marginal tax rate that applies to the shareholder’s ordinary 
income.  The only difference is that the rates will change.  The tax will be 15 
percent if the shareholder’s ordinary income is subject to tax at the marginal rate 
of 25 percent or higher.  However, the dividend will be exempt from tax if the 
shareholder’s ordinary income is subject to tax at a marginal rate below 25 
percent.  The following table summarizes by year how dividends are taxed to 
individual shareholders.35
Tax on Corporate Dividends
Received by Individuals
Year Dividend ReceivedMinimumHolding
Period
 Met Before2001 2001 2002
2003 –
2007 2008
2009 –
2010
After
2010
Yes N/A N/A N/A
15% or
5%
15% or
0% N/A N/A
No
Ordinary
Income:
15%
28%
31%
36%
39.6%
Ordinary
Income:
10%
15%
27.5%
30.5%
35.5%
39.5%
Ordinary
Income:
10%
15%
27%
30%
35%
38.6%
Ordinary
Income:
10%
15%
25%
28%
33%
35%
Ordinary
Income:
10%
15%
25%
28%
33%
35%
Ordinary
Income:
10%
15%
25%
28%
33%
35%
Ordinary
Income:
15%
28%
31%
36%
39.6%
Although the rules subject the profits of a business to tax at the corporate 
level and also at the shareholder level, there are many situations in which only 
one of the two taxes will apply.  For instance, the shareholders will not have to 
pay tax on any profits that are not actually paid to them as dividends.  In such a 
case only the corporation will be subject to tax on the earnings.  Alternatively, 
only a shareholder will be taxable on amounts paid to him as reasonable 
compensation for services rendered to the firm.  The corporation will pay no tax 
on these amounts because they are a deductible item that reduces the 
corporation’s taxable income.  
Because shareholders of (primarily closely held) corporations have an 
incentive to employ such strategies to avoid tax, there are rules designed to 
either penalize or outlaw such behavior.  A practice of not paying dividends to 
35 Different rules apply when dividends are paid to shareholders that are corporations.  
See I.R.C. §§ 243 – 246A. 
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shareholders could trigger the accumulated earnings tax.  The Internal Revenue 
Service is authorized to assess this penalty tax when it determines that the 
corporation has accumulated profits beyond the reasonable needs of the 
business.36 The tax is generally computed at a rate that corresponds to the rate 
that would apply to any dividends paid to a shareholder.  Thus, the current rate 
is 15 percent.37
Aside from the accumulated earnings penalty tax, the personal holding 
company tax would apply if two conditions are met.  First at least 60 percent of 
the corporation’s gross income must come from certain passive sources, like 
interest and dividends.38  Second, five or fewer individuals must own over half 
of the stock in the corporation.39  If these two conditions are met in any given 
year, a penalty tax is imposed on virtually all taxable income of the corporation 
from that year, other than amounts distributed to shareholders as a dividend.40
Unlike the accumulated earnings tax, the personal holding company tax applies 
in a mechanical fashion.  It cannot be avoided by showing the absence of an 
intention to evade tax.41
Like the accumulated earnings tax, the penalty is computed at a rate that 
generally corresponds to the rate that would apply to dividends paid to a 
shareholder.  Thus, the current penalty rate is 15 percent.  After 2008, when the 
temporary tax cut on dividends expires, the rate will be adjusted to reflect the 
highest marginal tax rate that applies to individuals.  That rate currently stands 
at 35 percent, but it is due to revert to 39.6 percent after 2010.  
In cases where the corporation uses its profits to pay a shareholder 
compensation for services rendered to the business, there is only one restriction
on the firm’s ability to do so:  the amount must be reasonable.42 No bright line 
rule applies to determine whether a salary is reasonable.  Instead, the courts use 
a variety of tests.  Furthermore, in the event the corporation claims a deduction 
for compensation that is not reasonable, the corporation will still benefit from 
that deduction unless it is adjusted after being challenged by the Internal 
Revenue Service.  Because unreasonable compensation is difficult to detect, 
many such overstated deductions go unchallenged.  
2. Taxation of the Income of an S Corporation
36 I.R.C. §§ 531, 532(a), 533(a).  
37 I.R.C. § 531.
38 I.R.C. § 542(a)(1).
39 I.R.C. § 542(a)(2).
40 I.R.C. §§ 541,545.
41 Cf. I.R.C. §§ 532(a), 533.  When the personal holding company tax applies, the 
accumulated earnings tax will not.  I.R.C. § 532(b)(1).
42 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1).
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Federal tax law permits any corporation that satisfies certain eligibility 
requirements to elect to be treated as a small business corporation for federal tax 
purposes.43  As a result, the corporation would be subject to the rules of 
subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code.  Under subchapter S, the corporation 
does not pay any corporate tax on the income of the business.44 Instead, the 
business profits are taken into account by each shareholder to determine their 
individual income tax liabilities.45  The amount that any shareholder takes into 
account is referred to as the shareholder’s pro rata share and reflects his 
percentage interest in the corporation.46 Thus, an individual who owns half the 
stock in an S corporation in any given year is taxable on half of any income (or 
loss) generated by the corporation in that year.  
The actual tax that an S corporation shareholder pays on any income 
allocated to him will depend on the source of the income.47 Thus, any item of 
income that the corporation derives from a tax exempt source will be tax exempt 
to the shareholder.  Similarly, any item of income that the corporation derives 
from the sale of a capital asset that the corporation held for over a year will be 
taxed at the rate that applies to long term capital gains.48 Meanwhile, any item of 
income that the corporation derives from a source other than one that is subject 
to a special rate of tax is treated as ordinary income, making it subject to tax at 
the marginal rates that apply to all of the shareholder’s ordinary income.49  An S 
corporation is commonly referred to as a flow-through entity precisely because 
any income generated by the corporation retains its character when allocated to 
the shareholders as pro rata shares.  Moreover, this income is taxed to the 
shareholders in the year earned by the corporation, not the year received from 
the corporation.
43 Under current law, an S corporation can have no more than 100 shareholders, all of 
whom must be individuals (other than nonresident aliens), certain trusts or estates.  I.R.C. § 
1361(b)(1)(A), (B) and (C).  In addition, there can only be one class of stock in the corporation.  
I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D).  Finally, the S election is not available to certain financial institutions, 
insurance companies, domestic international sales corporations, or corporations that have made 
an election under section 936.  I.R.C. § 1361(b)(2).
44 I.R.C. § 1363(a).  There are two very narrow exceptions to this general rule.  In certain 
cases where an S election has not been in effect throughout the life of the corporation, an S 
corporation may be liable for two different taxes.  A tax on built-in gains could apply if an S 
corporation realizes a gain on the sale of an appreciated asset it owned at the time the S election 
took effect.  I.R.C. § 1374.  Second, if the S election took effect before the time the corporation 
distributed any accumulated profits to its shareholders, a tax on excess passive investment 
income could apply until the corporation actually distributes those accumulated profits to its 
shareholders.  I.R.C. § 1375.
45 I.R.C. § 1366(a).
46 I.R.C. § 1377(a)(1).
47 I.R.C. § 1366(b).
48 I.R.C. § 1(h).
49 See discussion accompanying notes 26 et seq.
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A shareholder in an S corporation is taxable on amounts he actually 
receives from the corporation depending on the reason for the payment.  To the 
extent the payment is a distribution of the business profits previously allocated 
to the shareholder, the payment will not be taxable to him.50  (The tax was 
already imposed when the corporation allocated its income to the shareholder as 
a pro rata share.)  However, if the shareholder receives a payment that 
constitutes compensation for services rendered to the corporation, the payment 
will be taxable as income to him, just as compensation from any other source 
would.51  Such compensation will also be a deductible expense to the
corporation, provided the amount is reasonable for the services rendered.52  Like 
any other deductible expense, the payment will reduce the amount of business 
profits that are left to be allocated to the shareholders as taxable pro rata shares.53
The net effect is that the income tax of a shareholder in an S corporation is based 
partly on amounts that the corporation pays to him as compensation, and partly 
on the profits (net of compensation expense) the corporation allocates to him as a 
pro rata share.  
3. Taxation of the Income of a Partnership or Multi-Member 
Limited Liability Company
Subchapter K contains the default rules that determine the extent to which 
the profits of a business are taxed when the business is conducted as a 
partnership or limited liability company that has more than one member.  As 
discussed above, both such business entities are treated as a partnership for 
federal income tax purposes.54 As a general rule, the profits of a business 
conducted are not taxed at the partnership level.55  Instead, the partners are taxed 
on their respective shares of the taxable profits of the business.56  In any given tax 
year, a partner will be allocated a share of the partnership’s business profits and 
other items.57  Such an allocation is referred to as the partner’s distributive 
share.58  To the extent a partnership has made an allocation of profits to a 
partner, the partner will not pay tax on those profits when he actually receives 
them in the form of a distribution from the partnership.59 Thus, if a 50-50 
50 I.R.C. § 1368(b)(1).  
51 I.R.C. § 61(a)(1).    
52 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1).  
53 I.R.C. §§ 1363(b); 1366(a), (c).
54 See discussion accompanying note 12. 
55 I.R.C. § 701.
56 Id.
57 I.R.C. § 702.
58 I.R.C. § 702(a).
59 I.R.C. § 731(a)(1).  The statute specifically permits a partner to receive a distribution tax 
free up to the partner’s basis in the partnership.  A partner acquires (or loses) basis as a result of 
an allocation of profits (or losses) to the partner in the form of distributive shares.  I.R.C. § 705(a).
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partnership makes $100,000 in taxable income in one year, each partner will be 
allocated and taxable on $50,000.  However, neither partner will be subject to tax 
when they actually receive a distribution of that money from the partnership.
Like an S corporation, a partnership derives its flow-through qualities 
from the fact that only the partners, not the business, are taxable on the profits of 
the business.60   In addition, a partner’s actual tax liability will depend in part on 
the source of any income item allocated to him.61  Thus, if the partnership derives 
income from a tax exempt source, the partners will pay no tax on their respective 
allocations of that item.  Similarly, any item of income that the partnership 
derives from the sale of a capital asset that the partnership held for over a year 
will be taxable to the partner at the rate that applies to long term capital gains.62
Meanwhile, any item of income that the partnership derives from a source other 
than one that is subject to a special rate of tax is treated as ordinary income, 
making it subject to tax at the marginal rates that apply to all of the partner’s 
ordinary income.63
A partner is taxable on amounts he actually receives from a partnership 
depending on the reason for the payment.  To the extent the payment is a 
distribution of the business profits previously allocated to the partner, the 
payment will not be taxable to the partner.64  (The tax was already imposed when 
the partnership allocated its income to the partner as a distributive share.)  
However, if the partner receives a payment that constitutes compensation for 
services rendered to the partnership, the payment will be taxable as income to 
the partner, just as compensation from any other source would.65 Referred to as 
a form of “guaranteed payment”, such compensation paid to a partner will also 
be a deductible expense to the partnership, provided it is reasonable for the 
services rendered.66 Like any other deductible expense, the payment will reduce 
the amount of business profits that are allocated to the partners as taxable 
distributive shares.67  The net effect is that the income tax of a partner will be 
based partly on amounts that the partnership pays to him as a guaranteed 
payment of compensation, and partly on the profits (net of compensation 
expense) the partnerships allocates to him as a distributive share.  
60 I.R.C. § 701.
61 I.R.C. § 702(b).
62 I.R.C. § 1(h).
63 See discussion accompanying footnote 26 et seq.
64 I.R.C. § 731(a)(1).  
65 I.R.C. § 61(a)(1).  The payment is taxable income to the partner only if the amount of 
the payment does not depend on the income of the partnership.  I.R.C. § 707(c).  Otherwise, the 
transaction is treated as an allocation of partnership profits to the partner, followed by an actual 
payment of those profits to the partner.  Cf. I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(A).  
66 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1).  The deduction is only available if the amount of compensation does 
not depend on the income of the partnership.  I.R.C. § 707(c).
67 I.R.C. §§ 707(c); 703(a).
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Although the rules that apply to partnerships and S corporations are 
similar in many ways, the partnership rules generally allow for more flexibility.  
First, there are several restrictions on the number and the type of shareholders 
that a corporation can have in order to be eligible to convert to (and remain) an S 
corporation.68  These restrictions stand in contrast to the absence of any 
limitations on the types and number of investors that can be partners in a 
partnership.  In addition, in an S corporation, all items of income, loss and 
deduction and credit must be allocated among the shareholders each year pro 
rata, based on the number of shares they own and the length of time they owned 
the shares.69  By contrast, in a partnership, virtually any allocation that the 
partners choose will be respected as long as the allocation tracks the economic 
relationship between the partners.70  This generally means that the allocations of 
partnership income and other items control what the individual partners are 
entitled to receive in the form of actual payouts.71  Moreover, because an S 
corporation can only have one class of stock, it cannot single out any individual 
shareholder for the payment of dividends.72  Rather, any distribution of business 
profits must be shared by all shareholders on the basis of the number of shares 
owned.  By contrast, if a partnership wants to make a distribution to just one 
partner, it can do so.  Similarly, if it wants to make a distribution to several 
partners, there is no requirement that the distribution be allocated among its 
recipients in any particular way.  
B. Federal Taxes on an Employee-Owner’s Income from Labor
There are two sets of federal employment tax statutes that may apply to 
an individual who works for a business he also owns.  The first is the Federal 
Insurance Contribution Act (“FICA”), which imposes a tax that is commonly 
referred to as the social security tax.  The second is the Self-Employment 
Contribution Act (“SECA”), which imposes a tax that is often referred to as the 
self-employment tax.  The amounts collected under both acts are earmarked for 
funding social security and Medicare benefits.73 The two acts are mutually 
exclusive so that only one set of rules will ever apply to any given dollar of 
earnings.  Thus, when the FICA rules apply, the SECA rules will not, and vice 
versa.  
The statutes are intended to impose a tax on income from labor, as 
opposed to any returns on capital.  As a result, each statute attempts to define the 
68 See footnote 43.
69 I.R.C. §§ 1366(a), 1377(a)(1).
70 I.R.C. § 704(b).
71 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b).
72 I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D).
73 42 U.S.C. § 401 (2005).
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tax base in a way that isolates such labor income.74  However, because it can be 
difficult to distinguish such income from what an employee-owner receives as a 
return on capital, the line that separates the two can often appear arbitrary.75
1. FICA
The tax imposed by FICA has two components.  The first is the old-age, 
survivors, and disability insurance component, often referred to as OASDI.  It is 
a 12.4 percent levy on amounts that constitute “wages from employment.”76  One 
half of the tax is deducted from the employee’s compensation.77  The employer 
pays the other half.78 This component of the FICA tax is earmarked to cover 
social security benefits.  There is a limit on the amount of wages that can be 
taxed.79 Referred to as the contribution and benefit base, this limit is $94,200 for 
2006.80 Thus, any wages from employment beyond that limit are exempt from 
the FICA-OASDI tax.  The contribution and benefit base is adjusted each year to 
reflect increases in average wages of the U.S. economy.81
The second component of the FICA tax is the hospital insurance 
component.  It is a 2.9 percent levy on an individual’s “wages from 
employment.”  As with the OASDI component, one half of this tax is deducted  
from the employee’s compensation, while the employer pays the other half.  
However, unlike the OASDI component, there is no limit on the amount of 
wages from employment that is subject to the tax.  Thus, the hospital insurance 
tax applies to all amounts that qualify as wages from employment, even amounts 
that exceed the OASDI contribution and benefit base.  The hospital insurance 
component of the FICA tax is earmarked to cover Medicare benefits.
The FICA tax will apply to a self-employed individual only when he 
operates the business through either a C corporation or an S corporation.  In 
those instances, only amounts that the corporation pays to the employee-owner 
as remuneration for employment count as wages from employment.82 Thus, only 
those amounts are subject to the FICA tax.  The individual’s share of any other 
profits of the business simply is not subject to the FICA tax, even if it could be 
considered the product of the employee-owner’s labor.  As a result, earnings that 
the corporation retains are not subject to the FICA tax.  Nor are amounts paid to 
74 Patricia E. Dilley, Breaking the Glass Slipper – Reflections on the Self-Employment Tax, 
54 Tax Law. 65 (2000).
75 Lester B. Snyder, Taxation with An Attitude:  Can We Rationalize the Distinction 
Between “Earned” and “Unearned” Income?, 18 Va. Tax Rev. 241 (1998).
76 I.R.C. §§ 3101(a), 3111(a).
77 I.R.C. § 3102(a).
78 I.R.C. § 3111(a).
79 I.R.C. § 3121(a)(1).
80 Notice 2005-85, 2005-46 I.R.B. 961.
81 42 U.S.C. § 430 (2005).
82 I.R.C. § 3121(a).
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an employee-shareholder as a dividend.  By defining the tax base in this way, 
FICA presents the opportunity for individuals to manage or control their 
employment tax liability when they own and control a business conducted 
through an S corporation or a C corporation.  In such cases, the individual can 
determine whether compensation is paid, when it gets paid, and how much is 
paid.  By exercising this power, the individual necessarily controls whether he 
must pay the FICA tax, when he must pay the FICA tax, and how much tax he 
must pay.
A limited liability company that is treated as a corporation enjoys 
additional tax planning opportunities.  Because shares in a state law corporation 
belong to designated classes, all owners of shares in a given class must share in 
any distribution paid to one class member; the corporation cannot single out an 
individual shareholder to receive a dividend distribution.  No such restriction 
applies to a limited liability company.  Thus, the company is entirely free to 
single out one of its members for a distribution.  Similarly, the company could 
make a distribution to several members and not be obligated to allocate the 
payment in any particular way.  This flexibility presents the opportunity for an 
employee-member to receive a distribution as disguised compensation for 
services rendered to company, potentially avoiding the member’s employment 
tax liability.  
2. SECA
The SECA tax operates as the FICA tax counterpart for self-employed 
individuals.  Accordingly, like the FICA tax, the SECA tax has two components.  
The first component is a 12.4 percent tax earmarked to finance social security 
benefits.  Its counterpart is the OASDI component of the FICA tax.  The second 
component is a 2.9 percent tax earmarked to fund the Medicare insurance 
program.83
The contribution and benefit base that applies to the OASDI component of 
the FICA tax also applies to the OASDI component of the SECA tax.  Thus, the 
OASDI tax applies to no more than $94,200 in 2006.  The SECA and FICA statutes 
are designed so that the OASDI component of the taxes will never apply to more 
than the FICA contribution and benefit base in effect for any year.84  Thus, if an 
individual has $100,000 of wages from employment in 2006, the FICA-OASDI tax 
would apply to the first $94,200, leaving no portion of any self-employment 
income to be taxed under SECA.  Conversely, if an individual has no wages from 
employment in 2006, there would be nothing to tax under FICA, while the SECA-
OASDI tax would apply to up to $94,200 of any income the individual may have 
from self-employment.   If, however, an individual has $40,000 of wages from 
83 I.R.C. § 1401(b).
84 See I.R.C. § 1402(b).
Working for Free
16
employment in 2006, the entire amount would be subject to the FICA-OASDI tax, 
while up to $54,200 of self-employment income would be subject to the SECA-
OASDI tax, resulting in a tax on no more than the $94,200 contribution and 
benefit base in effect for the year.  By operating in this way, the rules ensure that 
anyone whose income includes both wages from employment and income from 
self-employment will never be at a disadvantage to someone who has income 
does not have income from both sources. 85
Both components of the SECA tax apply to an individual’s “income from 
self-employment.” 86  The term does not include any amounts that are subject to 
the FICA tax.87 In addition, in order to count as income from self employment, 
an item must qualify as net earnings from self-employment (“NESE”). 88 What 
counts as NESE for a self-employed individual will depend on the kind of legal 
entity used to conduct the business enterprise.  It will also depend on the kind of 
ownership interest the individual may have in the business.  However, in no 
event will the SECA tax ever apply to amounts generated by a self-employed 
individual who conducts his business through either a C corporation or an S 
corporation.   In those cases, the payments they receive as compensation will be 
subject to the FICA tax.89  Any dividends received by a shareholder in a C 
corporation are expressly excluded from the reach of the SECA tax.90
Furthermore, SECA has no provision that would count as part of the tax base an 
individual’s the pro rata share from an S corporation.
Because the S corporation is a flow-through entity, one would expect that 
the SECA rules would control to determine the employment tax liability of any 
shareholder, just as they do to the owner of all other flow through business 
entities.  The fact that it does not is largely a relic of a bygone era.  When the self-
employment tax was enacted, the S corporation did not exist, so the tax base 
could not be defined by reference to amounts earned through such a business.  
Furthermore, when subchapter S was adopted, a shareholder’s pro rata share 
85 The fact that the OASDI component of the employment tax does not apply to amounts 
in excess of the annually contribution and benefit base distinguishes it from the generally 
progressive way in which the federal income tax operates.  The income tax applies only to the 
extent an individual has income that exceeds certain amounts that are either excluded, exempt, or 
deducted from gross income.  I.R.C. § 63.  The two federal employment taxes have been widely 
criticized for being regressive.  E.g., Deborah A. Geier, Integrating the Tax Burdens of the Federal 
Income and Payroll Taxes on Labor Income, 22 Va. Tax Rev. 1 (2002).
86 I.R.C. § 1401(a), (b).
87 I.R.C. § 1402(b)(1).
88 I.R.C. § 1402(b).
89 See discussion accompanying note 82.  See also I.R.C. § 1402(c)(2).
90 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(2).  The Internal Revenue Service has had limited success convincing 
courts to treat dividends as disguised remuneration for services rendered, causing such amounts 
to be subject to the FICA tax.  E.g., Nu-Look Design, Inc. v. Comm’r, 356 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2004); 
Radtke v. U.S., 712 F.Supp. 143 (E.D. Wis. 1989); Spicer Accounting, Inc. v. U.S., 918 F.2d 90 (9th
Cir. 1990).  See also Burgess J.W. Raby and William L. Raby, Shareholder Compensation:  How 
Low Can You Go?, Tax Notes Today, June 13, 1996, 96 TNT 116-62.
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was treated as a dividend.91  The SECA statute expressly states that net earnings 
from self employment do not include dividends.92  However, subchapter S was 
later revised to modify the tax character of an S corporation’s pro rata share.  
Today, a pro rata share is no longer regarded as a dividend.  Instead, the 
individual items of S corporation taxable income flow through to the 
shareholders, retaining their character in the hands of the shareholder.93  Even 
though this made a shareholder’s pro rata share virtually identical to a partner’s 
distributive share, Congress never updated the self-employment statute establish 
parity in the way the law applies to the two situations.  Thus, today the statute 
does not define net earnings from self-employment to include an S corporation 
shareholder’s pro rata share, while it does expressly include a partner’s 
distributive share of partnership income as such.94  Clearly, Congress could 
update the law if it could.  It has been suggested that Congress has not done so 
partly because it views the separate existence of the S corporation as a sufficient 
basis for treating pro rata share allocations as investment income, not income 
from labor.95
a. Partner in a Partnership
The employment tax base of a partner in a partnership depends on 
whether the partner is a general partner or a limited partner.  If a partner is a 
general partner, the self employment tax will apply to the partner’s distributive 
share allocation of partnership income.96  The tax will also apply to any 
guaranteed payment the partner receives, whether for the use of capital or for the 
performance of services.97  For a limited partner, the self employment tax applies 
91 I.R.C. § 1373(b) (1959).  
92 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(2).  In addition, the Internal Revenue Service concluded that such an 
item did not count as part of the shareholder’s net earnings from self-employment. Rev. Rul. 59-
221, 1959-1 C.B. 225.
93 I.R.C. § 1366(b), as amended by Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, P.L. No. 97354, 96 
Stat. 1669 (1982).  
94 I.R.C. § 1402(a).  
95 Fritz, supra note 3 at 825.
96 I.R.C. § 1402(a).  Certain adjustments are made to the partner’s distributive share to 
determine the amount that is subject to the self-employment tax.  The adjustments generally 
prevent the tax from applying to certain passive items of income that do not represent income 
from labor.  Thus, in computing the self-employment income of a partner, the distributive share 
is adjusted to exclude, among other things, interest and dividends, and gains and losses from the 
sale of capital assets.  I.R.C. § 1402(a)(2), (3).
97 Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-1(b).  The regulation predates a 1977 amendment that redefined 
what counts as self-employment income to a partner.  I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13), added by the Social 
Security Amendments of 1977, P.L. 95-216, § 313(b).  (This paragraph was originally added as 
paragraph 12.  However, P.L. 98-21, § 124(c)(2) redesignated paragraph 12 as paragraph 13.)  The 
change only affected what counts as self-employment income to a limited partner.  The legislative 
history does not elaborate on the intended scope of the change.  See H.R. Rep. No. 8-702, 95th
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only to the guaranteed payments received for the performance of services.98 It 
does not apply to their distributive share of income of the partnership.99  If a 
partner owns both a general partnership interest and a limited partnership 
interest, the self-employment tax applies to that portion of the partner’s 
distributive share associated with the general partnership interest only.100
There are no provisions in the self-employment tax statute or regulations 
that specify what distinguishes a limited partner from a general partner for 
purposes of the statute.101  This stands in contrast to standard articulated in the 
Revised Uniform Partnership Act.  Under those rules, a limited partner is not 
liable for the debts and obligations of the partnership, while a general partner is.  
Moreover, a limited partner risks loosing the protection of the limited liability if 
he participates in the control of the partnership.102  Thus, under current law, a 
partner’s exposure for the self-employment tax is purely a matter of the nature of 
the interest the partner owns in the partnership.  
One might expect that amounts received by a partner in exchange for the 
performance of services would count as wages from employment for FICA 
purposes.  However, the legislative history indicates that Congress expected that 
it would not be appropriate to treat the partnership as a separate taxpaying 
entity (as opposed to an extension of the partner) in certain situations.103 In 
addition, the Internal Revenue Service long ago concluded that it is 
inappropriate to treat a partnership as an employer of one of its members.104  As 
a result, payments that are considered to be made by the partnership to a partner 
who is not acting in his capacity as a partner will not count as wages that are 
subject to the FICA tax.  Instead, the amounts are treated as self-employment 
income to the partner.105
Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1977).  Thus, it appears that general partners remain subject to employment 
tax on guaranteed payments received both for services performed and for the use of capital.  
98 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13).
99 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13).
100 Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h).
101 However, there are proposed regulations which would consider the degree to which a 
limited partner participates in the operations of the partnership.  Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(2).  
Congress acted in 1997 to prohibit the Internal Revenue Service from finalizing these regulations.  
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, P.L. 105-34, § 935.
102 Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 303(a).
103 The 1954 Conference Report includes the following language:
[Section 707(a) provides] for the use of the “entity” approach in the treatment of the 
transactions between a partner and a partnership .  .  .  .  No inference is intended, 
however, that a partnership is to be considered a separate entity for the purpose of 
applying other provisions of the internal revenue laws if the concept of the partnership 
as a collection of individuals is more appropriate for such provisions.  
H.R. Rep. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1954).
104 Rev. Rul. 69-184, 1969-1 C.B. 256.
105 Id.
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b. Member of a Multi-Member Limited Liability 
Company
Because a multi-member limited liability company is treated as a 
partnership for federal income tax purposes (absent an election to be treated as a 
corporation), any member is treated as a partner in a partnership for purposes of 
the self-employment tax. However, applying the partnership rules to a limited 
liability company does not produce any clear answers.
A limited liability company has only one category of member, while the 
partners in a partnership can participate as either a general or a limited partner, 
depending on the level of liability protection the owner desires and the extent to 
which they intend to participate in the business of the partnership.   In a limited 
liability company, each member enjoys the same level of protection from liability
for the debts and obligations of the business; it is limited to the member’s 
investment in the company.106  In addition, a member does not jeopardize the 
limit on liability by participating in the business of the company.107
SECA applies a different set of rules depending on whether the individual 
is either a general or a limited partner in the partnership.  However, a limited 
liability company draws no such distinction between its members.  One could 
assert a reasoned basis for applying either rule.  For example, it would seem 
appropriate to treat a member as equivalent to a general partner since all 
members are in a position to participate in the operations of the company.108  On 
the other hand, one could argue that the limited partnership rules should apply 
on the grounds that that a member enjoys limited liability from the debts and 
obligations of the business, the hallmark of a limited partner’s status as such.109
Understandably, the absence of a clear rule has been an invitation for 
some to take the position that a member must comply with the rules that apply 
to limited partners when doing so works to their advantage.110 Taking that 
position minimizes the member’s employment tax liability because the member’s 
net earnings from self-employment would consist solely of amounts received 
from the company in exchange for services the member performed for the 
company; no part of the member’s allocation of business profits would be 
included in the employment tax base.
c. Sole Proprietor
106 Uniform Limited Liability Company Act [hereinafter “ULLCA”] (1996) §§ 303, 402(a).
107 ULLCA (1996) § 303(a).
108 ULLCA (1996) § 301(a), (c).
109 See ULLCA (1996) § 303.
110 See, e.g., Burgess J.W. Raby and William L. Raby, New Incentive for Avoiding SE and 
FICA Tax, Tax Notes Today, December 10, 1998, 98 TNT 237-58.
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If a single individual does not create or organize a formal entity through 
which to conduct a business, that individual is considered to be operating the 
business as a sole proprietor, a status that does not give rise to a separate legal 
entity.  Thus, the assets of the business are considered to be owned by the 
individual sole proprietor.  In addition, that individual is liable for the debts and 
obligations of the business.111
For purposes of the income tax, a sole proprietor is disregarded as a 
separate taxpaying entity.112  Thus, the business, as such, does not pay income 
tax on the profits generated by its activities.  Instead, any profits from the 
business are included in the gross income of the owner.113  Thus, the owner pays 
tax on the business profits at the rates that apply to the owner.114
Aside from having to pay income tax on the business profits, a sole 
proprietor also will have to pay self-employment tax on those business profits.115
Thus, as a general rule, any amounts that will be taxed to the owner for income 
tax purposes will also be taxed to the owner for employment tax purposes.  
However, business losses are treated differently under the income and 
employment taxes.  Under the income tax, the sole proprietor can utilize the loss 
to offset taxable income from other sources, both in the year of the loss and in 
other tax years.116  Thus, for example, if the business loses $10,000 in its first year 
of operation, and if the owner has income from other sources in that year, the 
loss will offset $10,000 of income from those other sources, triggering a reduction 
in the owner’s income tax liability.  However, if the owner has no income from 
other sources or if the income from those other sources is less than what he lost 
from the business, the owner can utilize that loss to offset taxable income in other 
years.  The loss is generally utilized in the prior two tax years and the succeeding 
twenty tax years.117  A special rule permits the individual to waive the use of a 
loss to offset income in prior years.118  By permitting the owner to utilize a loss to 
offset income in years other than the one in which the loss arose, the income tax 
rules essentially represent an exception to the general requirement that 
individuals must compute their income tax liability on the basis of the activities 
and events that occur within specific annual accounting period.
111 For a discussion of the sole proprietorship, see Larry E. Ribstein, Unincorporated 
Business Entities (3d ed.) chapter 2.01.
112 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2)(i).  The mechanism for doing so is the Schedule C, which 
the owner must complete and include when filing her annual tax return.
113 I.R.C. § 61(a)(3).
114 Individuals are taxed under a graduated rate structure whose rates range from 10% to 
35%.  I.R.C. § 1(a) through (d); Rev. Proc. 2003-85.  The 10% bracket will expire after 2008, leaving 
the lowest bracket of income to be taxed at 15%.  The tax applies to amounts that exceed any 
exemptions, exclusions and deductions that are allowed to the individual.  I.R.C. § 63.
115 I.R.C. § 1402(a).
116 I.R.C. § 172(a).
117 I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(A).
118 I.R.C. § 172(b)(3).
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By contrast, the employment tax rules generally do not permit a business 
loss to reduce the amounts subject to employment tax.  Thus, if a sole proprietor 
has wages from employment in a year that he also sustained a $10,000 loss from 
the business, the business loss will not offset any portion of the wages, which 
will be subject to the FICA tax to the extent they do not exceed the contribution 
and benefit base.  However, if an individual has several businesses that are each 
operated as a sole proprietorship, a loss sustained by one business will be taken 
into account to determine the individual’s net earnings from self-employment for 
that year.119  However, if the loss from one business exceeds the profits from all 
the other businesses, the net loss still is not available to offset taxable amounts in 
other years.  In this way, the employment tax rules treat multiple businesses as 
one enterprise, while continuing to base the individual’s employment tax liability 
solely on the activities and events that occur during a particular annual 
accounting period.
C. Commentary on the Employment Tax Scheme
The existing federal employment tax statutory scheme is defective in 
several respects.  First, it lacks a clear rule that applies to a member of any
limited liability company that has not elected to be treated as a corporation for 
federal income tax purposes.  The gap in the law gives rise to tax planning 
opportunities that can produce several undesirable outcomes.  First, it increases 
the role that tax considerations play in the selection of an entity for conducting a 
business enterprise.  Ideally, the choice of a business entity should not be 
influenced by tax considerations.  Second, it creates the very real potential that 
individuals who may be identical situations will interpret the law differently, 
leading to different computations of their employment tax liability.  In an ideal 
world, individuals in substantially similar situations should pay the same tax.  
Third, the government is likely to collect less than what it is due in tax, leading to 
underfunding of the Social Security and Medicare programs at a time when their 
long term financial solvency is in question.  Fourth, the absence of clarity can 
increase how much it costs taxpayers to comply with the law.  At one extreme, 
taxpayers who are willing and able to obtain competent tax advice will do so 
when such an expense can be avoided if the law merely enunciated a clear rule.  
Finally, the mere existence of a tax planning opportunity runs the risk of 
undermining respect for a tax system that relies on voluntary compliance, 
increasing the need for the government to fund enforcement activities.  
Another defect in the existing statutory scheme is that the tax liability of a 
partner in a partnership depends on whether the partner owns a general or 
limited partnership interest.  The use of two separate rules dates back to a time 
when there was a substantive difference between the two classes of partners.  
119 Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(c).  
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The self-employment tax rules initially required all partners (whether limited or 
general) to be taxed on their distributive share of income.120  At the time, a 
limited partner had to be a passive investor in the partnership, or risk loosing the 
protection of limited liability.  Congress later determined that it was 
inappropriate to treat as earnings from work amounts allocated to a limited 
partner who did not (and could not) play an active role in the business.121  As a 
result, Congress changed the law so that the self employment tax of a limited 
partner would only be based on amounts the partner received in exchange for 
rendering services to the business.122  Over the course of time, however, state law 
has evolved to permit individuals to play active roles in an unincorporated
business without loosing the protection of limited liability.123  As a result, it no 
longer makes sense for the self-employment tax to be based on the mere 
designation of a partner as a general or limited one.
Continued use of an outdated rule can cause individuals who are in 
otherwise similar situations to pay a different tax.  Taxpayers can loose respect 
for the tax system when it produces such inconsistent outcomes.  In addition, the 
continued reliance on an immaterial factor in the computation of tax liability can 
represent an undesirable tax planning opportunity that, because of its very 
existence, can further undermine the respect taxpayers have for the system.  
When taxpayers loose respect for the system, compliance rates are likely to suffer 
and income is likely to go underreported with greater frequency, making it 
necessary to commit more government funds in enforcement activities to reverse 
the trend.
A third defect is that different rules apply to determine the employment 
tax base of an employee-owner of a business depending on the business entity 
that is used to conduct the enterprise.  Under current law, the SECA rules apply 
to sole proprietors and to any individual with an interest in a partnership or 
other unincorporated business entity that has not elected to be treated as a 
corporation for federal income tax purposes.  Under those rules, the employment 
tax base can consist of the employee-owner’s entire share of the profits of the 
business, in addition to any compensation the individual receives for services 
rendered.  By contrast, the FICA rules apply to any individual who owns an 
interest in any state law corporation or any unincorporated business entity that 
has elected to be treated as a corporation for federal income tax purposes.  Under 
those rules, the tax base consists solely of amounts the employee-shareholder 
receives as compensation for services rendered.  An individual’s liability for 
employment tax should not depend on mere formalities.  
120 I.R.C. § 1402(a) (1949).
121 H.R. Rep. No. 702, Part I, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 40-41 (1977).
122 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13).
123 These developments include adoption of legislation recognizing the limited liability 
company, the limited liability partnership, and the limited liability limited partnership.
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Federal employment taxes are intended to apply to income from labor.  
When an individual works for a business he also owns and control, it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to determine the extent to which the profits of the business are 
the result of the employee-owner’s labor or a return on any capital that may be 
invested in the business.  Wherever the line may fall, it seems unlikely to depend 
on the legal formalities that matter under the current statutory scheme.  
Moreover, whatever standard is used to draw the distinction, it should apply to 
all individuals who work for a business they also own and control.  It should not 
matter whether the business operates through a corporation, partnership, limited 
liability company, sole proprietorship or some other vehicle yet to be created.  
III. Recent Proposal for Reform
A. Proposal of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation 
The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (the “JCT Staff”) has 
advanced a proposal that goes a part of the way toward addressing these three 
defects.124 The JCT Staff proposal would extend to any owner of a flow through 
business entity the current set of rules that apply to general partners under the 
self-employment tax.  Thus, all such owners would generally have to pay self-
employment tax on the profits of the business allocated to them, even if such 
income is not actually paid out to them.  These owners would also be taxable on 
any compensation received for services rendered to the business.  However, if 
the owner does not materially participate in the business, only the owner’s
reasonable compensation from the entity is treated as subject to SECA tax.  This 
approach would apply to any owner in a business other than a sole proprietor 
and a shareholder in a taxable corporation.
The JCT Staff proposal retains the current limitation on the kinds of profits 
that are taxable to an owner under the self-employment tax.  Thus, certain types 
of passive income like dividends and interest, certain gains, and other items that 
do not seem to qualify as income from labor would not be subject to tax.  
However, the proposal carves out an exception when the entity is in a service 
trade or business.  In such situations, all of the profits allocated to an owner are 
treated as net earnings from self-employment.125
In his testimony at a May 5, 2005 Congressional hearing on Social 
Security, George K. Yin, Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation 
explained the rationale for the rule.  
124 Joint Committee on Taxation, Options to Improve Tax Compliance and Reform Tax 
Expenditures 99-104 (Jan. 27, 2005) JCS-02- 05.
125 A service business is defined to be one whose activities involve the performance of 
services in the fields of health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial science, 
performing arts, or consulting.  This definition is similar to the one that appears in Code section 
448(d)(2).
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“The conceptual premise of the proposal is that the base for FICA and 
SECA taxes is labor income.  The proposal applies this notion more 
uniformly than does present law to individuals who perform services for 
or on behalf of a pass-through entity in which they own an interest (i.e., a 
partnership, limited liability company, or S corporation).  The proposal 
treats such individuals similarly to sole proprietors, as well as similarly to 
each other.  Not only does this more uniform treatment improve the 
fairness of the tax law and increase the internal consistency of the tax 
rules, it also tends to improve tax neutrality by reducing the importance of 
FICA and SECA tax differences in taxpayers’ choice of business entity.”126
The JCT Staff proposal appears to adequately address the three principal 
defects in federal employment tax law in the following ways.  First, the proposal 
eliminates the uncertainty over how a member of a limited liability company 
should determine his employment tax liability.  Second, it disregards a partner’s 
status as a general or limited partner as a factor in the computation of the 
partner’s employment tax liability, substituting a rule that considers the degree 
to which the partner participates in the business of the partnership.  Third, the 
proposal enunciates a uniform procedure for computing the employment tax 
liability of any individual who owns an interest in any nontaxable business 
entity.  Thus, under the proposal, the provisions of SECA would apply to 
determine the employment tax liability of anyone who owns an interest in an S 
corporation or any unincorporated entity that has not elected to be treated as a 
corporation for federal income tax purposes.  
The JCT Staff proposal has been widely endorsed by the practicing bar for 
establishing a clear and uniform rule that applies to any employee-owner of a 
flow through entity.127  In addition, although there are many different views on 
how best to distinguish an employee-owner’s labor income from any return on 
capital invested in business, the organizations and individuals who have voiced 
their reaction to the proposal seem to believe that it strikes an appropriate 
balance between the interest in basing the tax on a precise measure of labor 
income, and the interest in using a rule that taxpayers can understand and apply 
with relative ease.128
B. Commentary on the JCT Staff Proposal
126 George K. Yin, Testimony at a Hearing of the Senate Committee on Finance on “Social 
Security:  Achieving Sustainable Solvency,” May 25, 2005 (JCX-38-05).
127 E.g., New York State Bar Association Tax Section, Comments on JCT Recommendation 
Relating to Employment and Self-Employment Taxes of Partners, LLC Members and S 
Corporation Shareholders (Sept. 23, 2005) reprinted in Tax Notes (Oct. 31, 2005) at 675.
128 Id.
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The JCT Staff proposal does indeed represent an improvement over the 
current state of affairs.  Among other things, by imposing the employment tax on 
amounts that a business makes for an employee-owner, not merely what the 
business pays to that person as compensation, the proposal severely reduces the 
opportunity for the understatement of labor income, and the underpayment of 
employment tax, by such individuals.  However, because the rules do not apply 
to employee-shareholders of taxable corporations, the proposal falls short of 
establishing parity in the way federal employment tax rules apply to all 
individuals who conduct a business through a business entity.  
The problems associated with this inconsistency are most apparent in the 
case of individual who plays a controlling role in the business that employs him.  
Such a business may generate profits that represent solely the product of the 
employee-owner’s labor.  However, under the JCT Staff proposal, if the business 
is conducted through a partnership, an employment tax would apply to the 
employee-partner’s entire distributive share of the profits for the year, plus any 
salary.  Meanwhile, if the business is conducted through a corporation, an 
employment tax would only apply to amounts actually paid to an employee-
shareholder as compensation.  That amount may be less than the individual’s 
share of the business profits in any given year.  In fact, it may be zero.
Indeed, in the setting of a corporation that is controlled by an employee-
shareholder, that owner has an economic incentive to deal with the business in 
ways that minimize the total tax that both he and the corporation must pay.  
There is no reason this consideration would not play a role when the employee-
shareholder wants to access the profits of the business and needs to decide how 
to do so.  There could be many aspects to this decision, including whether the 
payout should take the form of compensation or a dividend, the amount of the 
payout and when it should occur.  
Before the temporary dividend tax cut, the ability of a controlling 
employee-shareholder to exploit this flexibility had limited practical significance 
for employment tax purposes.  In almost all cases, the combined tax liability of 
the corporation and the individual would be kept to a minimum if a payout were 
structured as compensation.  Thus, there was almost no risk that a corporation 
would pay a dividend as a form of disguised compensation, potentially 
shortchanging the social security and Medicare trust funds. The primary 
advantage in the corporate setting was that a controlling employee-shareholder 
could decide whether to access the profits of the business at all.  If he did not, 
none of the taxes associated with the transfer of money between him and the 
corporation would apply. 
Ever since the temporary tax cut on dividends took effect, however, the 
math has changed.  Now, if a controlling employee-shareholder wants to access 
the earnings of the corporation, that individual frequently has an incentive to do 
so by causing the corporation to pay him a dividend.  To the extent the dividend 
is disguised compensation, the transaction avoids an employment tax that would 
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otherwise apply to generate funds for social security and Medicare benefits at a 
time when the long term financial stability of those programs is at risk.  
The following discussion illustrates the extent to which an incentive now 
exists for corporations to pay dividends as disguised compensation to controlling 
shareholders who work for the business.  Among other things, the discussion 
shows that the dividend tax cut does not change the incentives in all cases 
involving closely held corporations.  Rather, high income individuals who own 
and control low income corporations are the ones positioned to make the most of 
what appears to be an unintended tax saving opportunity created by the 
temporary dividend tax cut. 
IV. Financial Incentives to Minimize Federal Employment Tax
In order to illustrate the extent to which tax considerations can affect the 
form in which corporate profits are paid out to controlling employee-
shareholders, this analysis considers the simplified case of a corporation that has 
only one shareholder.  That individual also works for the company and desires to 
access $15,000 of the corporation’s earnings.  He faces the choice of structuring 
the payout as a year-end bonus or as a dividend. 129 For purpose of the analysis, 
it is assumed the employee-shareholder is a married individual who files a joint 
tax return with his spouse.  In addition, the analysis assumes that the business
made no less than $50,000 (before paying any compensation to the employee-
owner) in the year of the payout.130 Finally, the analysis assumes that any bonus 
paid by the corporation will be the employee-shareholder’s only source of 
income subject to employment tax.
The analysis does not take into account any alternative minimum tax 
liability that may apply to the employee-owner or to the corporation.131  In 
addition, although the phase out of deductions can affect the marginal rate that 
applies to the income of an individual, such phase outs are not taken into 
account.132
129 A shareholder can also receive a distribution in the form of a loan.  Because a loan 
must be repaid, it is materially different from both a dividend and compensation.  As a result, 
this analysis does not consider the tax consequences of a loan.
130 As previously discussed, a corporation is taxed at 15 percent on taxable income up to 
$50,000.  See discussion accompanying note 21 et seq.  As that discussion points out, the marginal 
rate could go as high as 39 percent when taxable income falls between $100,000 and $335,000.  By 
not assuming any ceiling on the corporation’s earnings, the analysis leaves open the possibility 
that the corporation would fall anywhere within the full range of marginal tax rates that applies 
to corporations.  
131 A corporation subject to the alternative minimum tax would generally be taxed at a 
flat 20 percent on an adjusted taxable income figure referred to as alternative minimum taxable 
income.  An individual subject to the alternative minimum tax is taxed under a two tiered 
graduated rate structure with 26 and 28 percent as the rates.  I.R.C. §§ 55 – 59.  
132 Robert J. Peroni, Reform in the Use of Phase-Outs and Floors in the Individual Income 
Tax System, 91 Tax Notes 1415 (Special Supp. , May 28, 2001).
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A. Compensation for Services
There are several tax effects produced by the payment of compensation by 
a corporation to an employee.  First, the corporation can deduct amounts paid 
that are reasonable for the services rendered to it.133 Any amounts received by 
the employee-owner as compensation count as gross income to him, triggering 
an income tax liability.134 In addition, because the compensation qualifies as 
wages from employment, it also triggers an employment tax liability under 
FICA, with the employee and the corporation each being responsible for half the 
tax. The corporation is entitled to deduct its half of the tax paid.135  That would 
reduce the income that is subject to the corporate tax, lowering the income tax 
liability of the business.136  The following sections quantify the amount of tax 
owed or saved as a result of each of these effects.  
1. Employment Tax Effects
The corporation will have to pay an amount equal to 6.2% of the bonus to 
cover its half of the OASDI component of the FICA tax.  Thus, it will owe $930 on 
a $15,000 bonus payment.137 Meanwhile, the employee would also have to pay 
$930 to cover his portion of the tax on that bonus.  Because the bonus is well 
below the contribution and benefit base, there is no possibility that any portion 
of the bonus would be exempt from the OASDI component of the tax.  
The corporation and the employee-shareholder will each have to pay a 
1.45% tax on the bonus to cover the hospital insurance component of FICA.  
Thus, a $15,000 bonus will cost the company $218 in tax, and it will also cost the 
employee-shareholder $218 in tax.138
2. Corporate Income Tax Effects 
133 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1).
134 I.R.C. § 61(a)(1).
135 I.R.C. § 162(a).
136 The amount of compensation paid would have ancillary consequences.  If the 
corporation pays for health insurance for the employee and his family, the deduction available to 
the corporation could depend on the amount paid to the employee.  In addition, the amount that 
the owner employee can receive as deferred compensation depends in part on the amount of 
compensation the owner employee receives.  These ancillary consequences are not taken into 
account in the analysis.
137 $15,000 × 6.2% =  $930.
138 $15,000 × 1.45% = $218.
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The corporation will be entitled to deduct from gross income any 
compensation it pays to its employee-owner.139  In addition, the corporation will 
be entitled to deduct its share of any employment tax on that compensation.140
These deductions will translate into a lower corporate income tax liability.  The 
actual tax savings will depend on the tax that would otherwise be due on income 
that is offset by the deductions.  
Because the corporate tax is imposed under a system of graduated 
marginal rates, the tax savings will depend on the tax bracket into which the 
corporation falls in the year it makes the payments.  As previously discussed, 
there are six marginal rates, ranging from a low of 15 percent to a high of 39 
percent.  At the low end of the spectrum, if the corporation is in the 15 percent 
bracket, $15,000 in business profits (unreduced by any bonus payment) would 
cost the corporation $2,250 in income tax.141  Conversely, if the corporation uses 
that money to pay a deductible bonus, there is no income left to be taxed, 
resulting in no income tax liability for the corporation on that money.  Thus, a 
$15,000 bonus payment would translate into $2,250 in tax savings for a 
corporation in the 15 percent tax bracket.  Meanwhile, at the high end of the 
spectrum, the same $15,000 bonus would translate into $5,850 of tax savings to a 
corporation in the 39 percent tax bracket.142
The corporation would also be entitled to deduct any employment tax it 
must pay on any bonus paid to an employee.  Like the deduction for the bonus 
itself, this deduction will also translate into tax savings that will vary with the
corporation’s marginal tax rate.  There is a $930 tax to cover the OASDI 
component of the FICA tax.143  That translates into $140 in tax savings if the 
corporation is in the 15 percent marginal tax bracket.144  The savings top off at 
$363 if the corporation is in the 39 percent marginal tax bracket.145 For the health 
insurance component of the FICA tax, any $15,000 of compensation would cost 
the corporation $218 in tax that the corporation could deduct in computing its 
taxable income.146 If the corporation is in the 15 percent tax bracket, that $218
deduction corresponds to $33 in income tax savings.147  Meanwhile, if the 
corporation is in the 39 percent tax bracket, that $218 deduction corresponds to 
$85 in income tax savings.148
139 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1).  If the corporation were publicly traded, the deduction for salaries 
paid to certain executives would be limited to $1 million.  I.R.C. § 162(m).
140 I.R.C. § 162(a).
141 $15,000 × 15% = $2,250.
142 $15,000 × 39% = $5,850.
143 Supra note 137.
144 $930 × 15% = $140.
145 $930 × 39% = $363.
146 Supra note 138.
147 $218 × 15% = $33.
148 $218 × 39% = $85.
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3. Individual Income Tax Effects
Any bonus received by the employee-shareholder will be included in his 
gross income and subject to tax under the system of graduated marginal rates 
previously described.149 For 2003 through 2010, the statute uses six marginal 
rates, ranging from a low of 10 percent to a high of 35 percent.  After 2010, the 
pre-2001 marginal rate structure takes effect.  It consisted of five marginal rates 
ranging from a low of 15 percent to a high of 39.6 percent.  Thus, the income tax 
cost associated with the receipt of a bonus will depend on two things.  First, it 
will depend on the year when the employee-shareholder receives the bonus. 
Second, it will depend on the employee-shareholder’s marginal rate tax bracket 
in that year.  Assuming the $15,000 bonus is received in 2006, the individual will 
have to pay as little as $1,500 in tax if he is in the 10 percent tax bracket.150
However, that $15,000 bonus will cost him as much as $5,250 in income tax if he 
is in the 35 percent tax bracket.151
The following table summarizes the net savings and costs on a $15,000 
bonus paid by the corporation to the shareholder in 2003 through 2010.  The net 
effect varies depending on two factors:  the corporation’s marginal tax rate and 
the shareholder’s marginal tax rate.  
$15,000 Bonus Paid by Corporation to Shareholder
Combined Tax Savings (Cost)
2003 through 2010
Shareholder Marginal Rate
Corp. Rate 10% 15% 25% 28% 33% 35%
15% ($1,373) ($2,123) ($3,623) ($4,073) ($4,823) ($5,123)
25% $242 ($508) ($2,008) ($2,458) ($3,208) ($3,508)
34% $1,695 $945 ($555) ($1,005) ($1,755) ($2,055)
35% $1,857 $1,107 ($393) ($843) ($1,593) ($1,893)
38% $2,341 $1,591 $91 ($359) ($1,109) ($1,409)
39% $2,503 $1,753 $253 ($197) ($947) ($1,247)
Among other things, the table shows that there are situations in which the 
corporation and employee-shareholder collectively save more in taxes than they 
owe.  The combined net savings is as high as $2,503 when the corporation is in 
the 39 percent marginal tax bracket and the shareholder is in the 10 percent 
marginal tax bracket.  As a practical matter, however, that particular paring of 
tax brackets represents an anomalous situation.152 Meanwhile, in the vast 
149 See discussion accompanying notes 26 through 31. 
150 $15,000 × 10% = $1,500.
151 $15,000 × 35% = $5,250.
152 The 10 percent tax bracket applies when an individual has taxable income that does 
not exceed $15,100.  That would mean that virtually all of the individual’s other income was 
offset by exemptions, exclusions and deductions of one kind or another.  The 39 percent tax 
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majority of situations, the payment of compensation produces a net tax cost.  The 
cost tops out at $5,123 when the corporation is in the 15 percent marginal tax 
bracket and the shareholder is in the 35 percent marginal tax bracket.  
After 2010, the range of outcomes will change because the existing 
schedule of marginal income tax rates that applies to individuals will be replaced 
with the schedule that had been in effect prior to 2001.  That schedule used five 
rates ranging from 15 percent to 39.6 percent.  This change will alter the calculus 
by increasing what the shareholder must pay in tax on the bonus.  That will 
increase the combined net tax cost, or eliminate any combined net tax savings, 
that would have otherwise occurred under the existing schedule of marginal 
rates.  The following table summarizes the range of outcomes produced after 
2010 on the assumption that the pre-2001 schedule of marginal rates takes effect.
$15,000 Bonus Paid by Corporation to Shareholder
Combined Tax Savings (Cost)
After 2010
Shareholder Marginal Rate
Corp. Rate 15% 28% 31% 36% 39.6%
15% ($2,123) ($4,073) ($4,523) ($5,273) ($5,813)
25% ($508) ($2,458) ($2,908) ($3,658) ($4,198)
34% $945 ($1,005) ($1,455) ($2,205) ($2,745)
35% $1,107 ($843) ($1,293) ($2,043) ($2,583)
38% $1,591 ($359) ($809) ($1,559) ($2,099)
39% $1,753 ($197) ($647) ($1,397) ($1,937)
The combined net tax effects associated with a bonus must be compared to 
the combined net tax effects associated with a dividend.  The following section 
computes the combined tax cost incurred by a corporation and its shareholder on 
the payment of a dividend.
B. Dividends
A payment of dividends triggers a different, and less complex, set of tax 
effects to the corporation and its employee-shareholder.  Understandably, there 
are no employment tax effects to consider.  In addition, because the corporation 
is not entitled to deduct any dividends paid to shareholders, there are no 
corporate income tax effects to consider.  The only income tax effects will occur 
at the level of the employee-shareholder.  
Dividends received by the employee-owner will count as gross income to 
him.153  As such they will be subject to tax.  As described above, the amount of 
bracket applies when a corporation has taxable income over $100,000 and up to $335,000.  I.R.C. § 
11(b).
153 I.R.C. § 61(a)(7).
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tax will depend on two factors:  the year of payment, and, where applicable, 
whether the dividend is a qualified dividend.154 This analysis assumes that any 
dividend received by the employee-owner will be a qualified dividend whenever 
applicable.  For 2003 through 2007, qualified dividends are taxable at one of two 
rates, depending on the marginal tax rate that applies to the recipient’s ordinary 
income.  If the recipient is in the 25 percent bracket or higher, a qualified 
dividend is taxed at 15 percent.155  If the recipient is any other tax bracket, a 
qualified dividend is taxed at 5 percent.156 In 2008, dividends are tax free to any 
recipient in a tax bracket below 25 percent, while the tax on dividends remains at 
15 percent in all other cases.157 The preferential rates that apply to qualified 
dividends are scheduled to expire after 2008. 158  Thus, the dividends would be 
subject to tax under the system of marginal rates that apply to all ordinary 
income.
This array of transitory rules makes it necessary to compute the combined 
net tax effects for many different periods of time.  A $15,000 dividend paid in 
2003 through 2007 will have a net tax cost of $2,250 if the recipient in the 25 
percent or higher marginal tax bracket.  The net tax cost will be $750 if the 
recipient is below the 25 percent tax bracket.  The following table summarizes the 
full range of outcomes.
$15,000 Dividend Paid by Corporation to Shareholder
Combined Tax Savings (Cost)
2003 through 2007
Shareholder Marginal Rate
Corp. Rate 10% 15% 25% 28% 33% 35%
All rates ($750) ($750) ($2,250) ($2,250) ($2,250) ($2,250)
A $15,000 dividend paid in 2008 will continue to have a net tax cost of 
$2,250 if the recipient is in the 25 percent or higher marginal tax bracket.  
However, there will be no tax cost if the recipient is below the 25 percent tax 
bracket.  The following table summarizes the full range of outcomes.
$15,000 Dividend Paid by Corporation to Shareholder
Combined Tax Savings (Cost)
2008
Shareholder Marginal Rate
Corp. Rate 10% 15% 25% 28% 33% 35%
154 See discussion accompanying notes 25 through 35.
155 I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(C).
156 I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(B).
157 I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(B).
158 The Bush administration has proposed making permanent the preferential rates of tax 
that apply to qualified dividends.
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All rates $0 $0 ($2,250) ($2,250) ($2,250) ($2,250)
A $15,000 dividend paid in 2009 and 2010 will have a net tax cost that will 
depend on the recipient’s marginal tax bracket.  The net tax cost will be as little 
as $1,500 if the recipient is in the 10 percent tax bracket.  The net tax cost will be 
as much as $5,250 if the recipient is in the 35 percent tax bracket.  The following 
table summarizes the full range of outcomes.
$15,000 Dividend Paid by Corporation to Shareholder
Combined Tax Savings (Cost)
2009 and 2010
Shareholder Marginal Rate
Corp. Rate 10% 15% 25% 28% 33% 35%
All rates ($1,500) ($2,250) ($3,750) ($4,200) ($4,950) ($5,250)
A $15,000 dividend paid after 2011 will continue to have a net tax cost that 
depends on the recipient’s marginal tax bracket.  However, because the pre-2001
tax brackets will replace the ones now in effect, the range of outcomes will be 
different.  At the low end of the spectrum, there will be a net tax cost of $2,250 if 
the recipient is in the 15 percent tax bracket.  The net tax cost will be as high as 
$5,940 if the recipient is in the 39.6 percent tax bracket.  The following chart 
summarizes the full range of outcomes.
$15,000 Dividend Paid by Corporation to Shareholder
Combined Tax Savings (Cost)
After 2010
Shareholder Marginal Rate
Corp. Rate 15% 28% 31% 36% 39.6%
All rates ($2,250) ($4,200) ($4,650) ($5,400) ($5,940)
C. Quantifying the Incentive
The difference between the combined net tax effects associated with each 
payout alternative will determine the extent to which there is a tax incentive for 
structuring a payout as one or the other.  Because the combined net tax effects 
produced in any case varies depending on a number of transitory rules, any 
comparison between the two payout options is valid for only a discrete period of 
time.  This analysis proceeds accordingly, starting with an analysis of the period 
covered by 2003 through 2007.  
In 2003 through 2007, qualified dividends are taxed as long term capital 
gains, and ordinary income is subject to tax under a temporary schedule of 
marginal rates ranging from 10 percent to 35 percent.  The following table shows 
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the extent to which the corporation and the shareholder collectively save more, 
or pay more, in tax when a $15,000 payout is structured as a bonus instead of a 
dividend.  
Tax Advantage of Paying $15,000
as a Bonus instead of Dividends 
2003 through 2007
Shareholder Marginal Rate
Corp. Rate 10% 15% 25% 28% 33% 35%
15% ($623) ($1,373) ($1,373) ($1,823) ($2,573) ($2,873)
25% $992 $242 $242 ($208) ($958) ($1,258)
34% $2,445 $1,695 $1,695 $1,245 $495 $195 
35% $2,607 $1,857 $1,857 $1,407 $657 $357 
38% $3,091 $2,341 $2,341 $1,891 $1,141 $841 
39% $3,253 $2,503 $2,503 $2,053 $1,303 $1,003 
The table indicates that a dividend costs more in tax than does a bonus in 
the vast majority of situations.  For instance, a $15,000 bonus enjoys a $1,003 tax 
advantage over a $15,000 dividend when the shareholder is in the 35 percent 
marginal tax bracket and the corporation is in the 39 percent marginal tax 
bracket.  In other words, in that situation the corporation and shareholder end up 
with $1,003 more after tax by structuring the payout as a bonus as opposed to a 
dividend.  However, there is a range of situations when a dividend enjoys a tax 
advantage over a bonus.  Specifically, that advantage exists whenever the 
corporation is in the 15 percent marginal tax bracket.  It also exists when the
corporation is in the 25 percent tax bracket and the shareholder is in one of the 
three highest income brackets.  In those situations, there is a financial incentive to 
substitute a dividend for a bonus in order to minimize the net tax cost to the 
shareholder and corporation.  The following chart depicts the range of outcomes 
graphically.
Figure 1
Tax Advantage to Paying $15,000
As a Bonus instead of Dividends
2003 - 2007
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The bars that rise above the zero dollar line represent the cases when a 
$15,000 bonus costs less tax than a dividend of the same amount.  Conversely, 
the bars that fall below the zero dollar line represent cases when a $15,000 
dividend costs less than a bonus of the same amount.  Thus, a shareholder-
employee in the 35 percent tax bracket will pay less in tax on a bonus, compared 
to a dividend, when the corporation is in any tax bracket above 25 percent.  
However, that same shareholder-employee will pay less in tax on a dividend, 
compared to a bonus, when the corporation is in any tax bracket below 34 
percent.  The length of the bar corresponds to the amount of tax dollars saved in 
any given case.  Thus, if the shareholder is in the 35 percent tax bracket and the 
corporation is in the 15 percent tax bracket, a dividend will cost nearly $3,000 less 
in tax compared to a bonus.  
The graph makes it easier to appreciate the distribution of benefits that are 
available when a dividend is substituted for a bonus.  Individuals in the three 
highest income brackets can save tax dollars by making the substitution in a 
wider range of situations.  In addition, when they do so, they save far more in 
taxes than their lower income counterparts do.  In effect, the can rich get richer 
when they work for free for a corporation they own and control.  
The range of outcomes changes slightly in 2008 when qualified dividends 
are tax exempt to any recipient whose ordinary income is taxed below 25 
percent.  Because the change in the law reduces the cost associated with making 
a dividend, the incentive to substitute a dividend for a bonus operates in a 
Working for Free
35
greater number of cases affected by the tax cut.  The following table quantifies 
the economic incentive to make the dividend-for-bonus substitution in 2008.  
Tax Advantage of Paying $15,000
as a Bonus instead of Dividends 
in 2008
Shareholder Marginal Rate
Corp. Rate 10% 15% 25% 28% 33% 35%
15% ($1,373) ($2,123) ($1,373) ($1,823) ($2,573) ($2,873)
25% $242 ($508) $242 ($208) ($958) ($1,258)
34% $1,695 $945 $1,695 $1,245 $495 $195 
35% $1,857 $1,107 $1,857 $1,407 $657 $357 
38% $2,341 $1,591 $2,341 $1,891 $1,141 $841 
39% $2,503 $1,753 $2,503 $2,053 $1,303 $1,003 
The chart shows that if the employee-shareholder is in the 15 percent tax 
bracket, there will be an incentive to substitute a dividend for a bonus in cases 
where the corporation is in the 25 percent tax bracket.  The following chart 
depicts the full range of outcomes graphically, permitting one to more easily 
appreciate the distribution of benefits available under a dividend-for-bonus 
substitution. 
Figure 2
Tax Advantage to Paying $15,000
In Compensation instead of Dividends
2008
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Prior to 2008, the dividend-for-bonus substitution produced more tax 
savings more frequently as the employee-shareholder moved into higher income 
tax brackets.  The temporary dividend tax exemption that applies to 2008 makes 
it possible for some lower income individuals to save more tax dollars in a 
greater number of cases than they would have otherwise.  However, individuals 
in the highest income brackets continue to enjoy the lion’s share of any tax 
savings by working for free.
If the temporary dividend tax cut expires after 2008, as scheduled, the 
incentive to substitute dividends for a bonus disappears.  The following table 
shows the extent to which the corporation and the shareholder collectively save 
when a $15,000 payout is structured as a bonus instead of a dividend after 2008.  
Tax Advantage of Paying $15,000
as a Bonus instead of Dividends 
2009 and 2010
Shareholder Marginal Rate
Corp. Rate 10% 15% 25% 28% 33% 35%
15% $127 $127 $127 $127 $127 $127 
25% $1,742 $1,742 $1,742 $1,742 $1,742 $1,742 
34% $3,195 $3,195 $3,195 $3,195 $3,195 $3,195 
35% $3,357 $3,357 $3,357 $3,357 $3,357 $3,357 
38% $3,841 $3,841 $3,841 $3,841 $3,841 $3,841 
39% $4,003 $4,003 $4,003 $4,003 $4,003 $4,003 
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The following chart depicts the outcomes graphically.
Figure 3
Tax Advantage to Paying $15,000
In Compensation instead of Dividends
In 2009 and 2010
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The chart underscores the fact that once the dividend tax cuts expire, there 
is no tax related incentive to pay a dividend as disguised compensation.  In effect 
the tradeoffs that had been in effect before the tax cuts were introduced will 
apply again.  Furthermore the incentive to substitute a dividend for a bonus will 
not exist after 2010 either, when the marginal income tax schedule that had been 
in effect prior to 2001 will apply.  The following table summarizes the extent to 
which a $15,000 bonus has a tax advantage over a $15,000 dividend after 2010.  
Tax Advantage of Paying $15,000
as a Bonus instead of Dividends 
After 2010
Shareholder Marginal Rate
Corp. Rate 15% 28% 31% 36% 39.6%
15% $127 $127 $127 $127 $127 
25% $1,742 $1,742 $1,742 $1,742 $1,742 
34% $3,195 $3,195 $3,195 $3,195 $3,195 
35% $3,357 $3,357 $3,357 $3,357 $3,357 
38% $3,841 $3,841 $3,841 $3,841 $3,841 
39% $4,003 $4,003 $4,003 $4,003 $4,003 
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The following chart depicts these outcomes graphically.
Figure 4
Tax Advantage to Paying $15,000
In a Bonus instead of Dividends
After 2010
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D. The Unequal Opportunity Tax Loophole
It seems clear that any tax savings to be realized by substituting dividends 
for a bonus will be enjoyed primarily by high income individuals.  As the charts 
and tables show the most tax savings occur when the employee-shareholder is in 
the highest tax brackets and the corporation is in the two lowest tax brackets.  
There is no evidence that concretely shows the extent to which high income 
individuals own and control corporations that make low incomes.  However 
there is compelling evidence that ownership of closely held corporations is 
severely concentrated in the hands of most wealthy individuals.  It also seems 
clear that all but a small minority of corporations have incomes low enough to 
place them in one of the two lowest tax brackets.
The available evidence shows that the stock in closely held corporations is 
concentrated in the hands of very wealthy individuals.  The Internal Revenue 
Service estimates that there were 6.5 million individuals in the U.S. with at least 
$625,000 in gross assets in 1998, representing 3.4 percent of the total U.S. adult 
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population.159  Nearly 1.3 million of this group of wealthy individuals, 
representing nearly 20 percent of the total, owned stock in non-publicly traded 
corporations.160  The total value of this stock was estimated to be over $1.3 
trillion.  However, such stock ownership was concentrated in the hands of the 
very wealthy.  
Individuals whose personal net worth exceeded $2.5 million accounted for 
10.5 percent of wealthy individuals, but they owned 73.5 percent of all stock in 
non- publicly traded corporations.  Individuals whose personal net worth 
exceeded $5 million accounted for 3.8 percent of all wealthy individuals, but they 
owned 59.8 percent of all stock in non-publicly traded corporations.  The 
following table details the distribution of non-publicly traded stock among 
individuals whose gross assets exceed $625,000.
Ownership of Non-Publicly Traded Stock 
by Owner’s Size of Net Worth
1998
Number 
in % to
Total 
Value % to
Size of Net Worth Class Total of Stock Total
(000) (000,000)
$20,000,000 or more 29 0.4% 453,989 34.3%
$10,000,000 under $20,000,000 51 0.8% 138,892 10.5%
$5,000,000 under $10,000,000 166 2.5% 198,902 15.0%
$2,500,000 under $5,000,000 440 6.7% 182,806 13.8%
$1,000,000 under $2,500,000 2,058 31.5% 236,900 17.9%
$600,000 under $1,000,000 2,494 38.2% 79,012 6.0%
Under $600,000 1,253 19.2% 31,493 2.4%
Less than Zero 39 0.6% 3,087 0.2%
TOTAL 6,530 1,325,081
Not only are closely held corporations more frequently owned by the 
wealthy, the evidence suggest that the vast majority of corporations have low 
incomes.
Statistics compiled by the Internal Revenue Service show that small 
corporations (measured by size of assets) account for the overwhelming share of 
all active corporations.  Active corporations with less than $5 million in assets 
accounted for over 97 percent of all corporations in 2002.  Moreover, it appears to 
be unusual when the income generated by these corporations is high enough to 
159 Barry W. Johnson and Lisa M.  Schreiber, Personal Wealth, 1998, Statistics of Income 
Bulletin (Winter 1998) at 87.
160 Id. At 103, tbl. 1.
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put place them outside the 15 percent tax bracket, which applies to income up to 
$50,000.  The average income for corporations with less than $500,000 in assets 
was $10,909.  The average income for corporations with assets falling between 
$500,000 and $1 million was $20,407.  The average income for corporations with 
assets falling between $1 million and $5 million was $48,154.  The following table 
shows the full distribution of corporations for 2002.161
Active Corporations with Assets
2002
% to Net Income Average
Asset Size Number Total (000) Net Income
$1 under $500,000 3,825,530 81.8% 41,734,405 10,909
$500,000 under $1,000,000 344,464 7.4% 7,029,441 20,407
$1,000,000 under $5,000,000 369,682 7.9% 17,801,498 48,154
$5,000,000 under $10,000,000 57,408 1.2% 8,429,533 146,836
$10,000,000 under $25,000,000 36,819 0.8% 4,805,044 130,504
$25,000,000 under $50,000,000 13,904 0.3% 5,527,357 397,537
$50,000,000 under $100,000,000 9,344 0.2% 5,781,520 618,741
$100,000,000 under $250,000,000 8,595 0.2% 10,110,897 1,176,370
$250,000,000 under $500,000,000 4,226 0.1% 16,452,094 3,893,065
$500,000,000 under $2,500,000,000 4,958 0.1% 83,007,982 16,742,231
$2,500,000,000 or more 1,909 0.0% 377,525,169 197,760,696
TOTAL 4,676,839 578,204,940
Thus, the opportunity to save taxes by substituting dividends for 
compensation is not an abstract matter.  Working for free is a very real option 
confronted by what appears to be a substantial number of individuals who own 
and control a corporation that employs them.  What’s more, there is compelling 
evidence that the opportunity to save tax taxes is not shared uniformly within 
the universe of owners of closely held businesses.  The rich stand more to gain, 
and there appears to be very few other individuals who are in a position to 
exploit this opportunity.  In a very real sense, the dividend tax cut has 
inadvertently created a rich man’s tax loophole that reduces employment tax 
161 See IRS, Statistics of Income Bulletin, Summer 2005, tbl. 1 at 75.  The statistics include 
data for both S corporations and C corporations.  S corporations account for approximately 60 
percent of all active corporations.  They also accounted for 32.6 percent of the net income 
generated by all corporations in 2002.  See Kelly Lutrell, S Corporation Returns, 2002, Statistics of 
Income Bulletin (Spring 2005) 59, figure D at 63, and Heather Duffy, Corporation Income Tax 
Returns, 2002, Statistics of Income Bulletin (Summer 2005) 67, table 1, at 75.  It is not possible to 
adjust the data to reflect solely the distribution and activity of C corporations.  However, even 
under the most conservative of assumptions, the evidence shows that all but a small minority of 
C corporations have income high enough to be taxed above the 15 percent and the 25 percent tax 
brackets.
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receipts at precisely the time when the social security and Medicare trust funds 
need the money more than ever.
V. Exposing and Reforming Employment Tax Defects
There is no economic incentive to substitute a dividend for a bonus after 
the dividend tax cut expires.  However, even in that situation, the corporate form 
offers employment tax advantages that other forms of doing business do not.  
Most important, a corporation can control when (if ever) the employment tax is 
triggered.  There is no employment tax liability as long as the corporation does
not pay compensation to an employee-owner.  In the event compensation is paid, 
the employment tax liability will be based on the amount paid.  Moreover, 
because compensation in excess of the FICA contribution and benefit base is 
exempt from the OASDI component of the tax, employment taxes could be saved 
by compressing multiple years worth of compensation into a single year.  Thus, 
if the owner received $180,000 in compensation in 2006, only $94,200 would be 
subject to the 12.4 percent OASDI tax.  The rest would be exempt from that tax, 
even though it may relate to services performed during a year when the 
corporation did not pay the owner a salary.  Therefore, even when the 
employment tax is triggered, the tax liability can be managed and minimized by 
an individual who owns and controls the corporation that employs him.  
The JCT Staff proposal virtually eliminates any opportunity for 
understating employment tax liability when an individual owns and works for a 
business conducted through a flow through entity.  That individual is subject to 
employment tax on any amounts paid as compensation and on the individual’s 
share of the profits of the business.  However, the JCT Staff proposal leaves in 
place the opportunities to understate employment tax liability when an 
individual owns and works for a business conducted through a corporation.  
Such an individual is only subject to employment tax on amounts actually paid 
as compensation.  Allowing this rule to remain in effect ignores the full range of 
opportunities to control and minimize employment tax liability when a self 
employed individual operates through a corporation.  
It makes little sense to have the employment tax liability of an individual 
depend on the business form through which the business is conducted.  
However, that is exactly what happens now, and it will continue to happen (with 
less frequency) in the event the JCT Staff proposal is adopted.  Formal 
distinctions appear to matter least in the case of a closely held business, where 
the interests of the business and a controlling employee-owner are not adverse.  
Transactions between the two parties are unlikely to occur at arms length.  The 
JCT Staff proposal prevents the employment tax from being a victim of self-
dealing when a flow-through entity is used to conduct a business.  However, the 
employment tax falls victim to self dealing when an individual operates his 
business through a corporation.  Not only does this represent an undesirable tax 
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planning opportunity, it can cause taxpayers who are in economically similar 
situations to be treated differently, solely because the rules operate by reference 
to irrelevant legal formalities.  
Federal employment tax rules would produce more sensible and uniform 
outcomes if economic realities, not legal formalities, played a greater role in 
determining how the rules apply.  There are real and compelling ways for 
individuals to understate their employment tax liability when they own a 
corporation that employs them.  These opportunities are more likely to be 
exploited when the individual is in a position to influence decisions by the 
corporation. Thus, any approach to address this situation should consider the 
extent to which such opportunities to exercise and exploit control exist.  As a 
general proposition, such opportunities occur in the closely-held corporation.
The JCT Staff proposal could be improved if its rules were made to apply 
to individuals who own and work for closely held corporations.  There are 
several ways to define a closely held corporation.  However, there are already a 
number of instances in which a corporation is considered to be closely held for 
income tax purposes if the corporation satisfies the stock ownership test 
contained in the personal holding company rules.162  Under that test, a 
corporation would be considered closely held if five or fewer individuals own 
more than 50 percent of the stock of the corporation during the last six months of 
the taxable year.163
Whenever a corporation qualifies as a closely held corporation, then the 
rules of SECA should apply to determine the employment tax liability of any 
owner, as follows.  First, the tax should apply to the investor’s share of the 
corporation’s earnings for any given year and to any amounts paid to the owner 
as compensation for services rendered.  A corporation is already required to 
compute its earnings and profits.164  The earnings and profits generated in any 
given year would be used to determine an employee-shareholder’s share.  That 
share would be a function of the shareholder’s interest in the corporation as 
measured by sock owned.  Thus, if the employee-shareholder owned 40 percent 
of the stock in a year that the corporation generated $160,000 in earnings and 
profits, $64,000 of that amount would represent that individual’s share of the 
corporation’s earnings.165  In addition, the self-employment tax would apply to 
any amounts actually paid to that individual as compensation.  However, if the 
shareholder does not materially participate in the business, only amounts 
actually paid to him as reasonable compensation would be subject to the SECA 
tax.  This approach would establish near complete parity in the way the rules 
162 The personal holding company stock ownership test is incorporated in the at risk 
rules.  I.R.C. § 465.  The test is also incorporated in the passive activity loss limitation rules.  I.R.C. 
§ 469A.  
163 See I.R.C. § 542(a)(2).
164 I.R.C. § 312.
165 $160,000 × 40% = $64,000.
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operate, regardless of the legal entity through which an individual conducts a 
business.  
The JCT Staff proposal applies two sets of rules to determine the extent to 
which the profits of the business are subject to employment tax.  For all 
businesses other than a service business, the employment tax applies only to the 
investor’s share of earnings other than certain passive income items that are 
already excluded from the definition of net earnings from self-employment.  
However, if the business is in a service business, no such adjustment is made.166
The distinction between service and non-service business should apply with 
equal force when the business is conducted through a corporation.  
The suggestions just proposed offer a number of advantages.  First, they 
would reduce the opportunities for undesirable tax planning that can 
shortchange the federal government in one way or another.  Second, they would 
promote greater consistency in the way taxpayers are treated, resulting in more 
sensible outcomes.  Finally, they would extend an element of economic reality to 
the way closely held businesses are addressed by federal tax law.  
There are a number of instances in which special rules already apply to 
prevent taxpayers from exploiting opportunities to utilize corporations to avoid 
or evade tax.  This is accomplished in a number of ways.  In some cases the 
approach is not to treat the corporation as a separate and distinct taxpaying unit.  
In other cases, the approach is simply to penalize or eliminate any advantage that 
may be gained by using a corporation as an element in a particular arrangement.  
In all instances, however, there is an element of economic reality that informs the 
approach.  
A. Use of Multiple Corporations
As a general rule, a corporation is considered to be a separate tax paying 
unit.  However, a corporation’s independent tax status may be disregarded if 
that corporation and one or more others are under common control.  It is more 
likely that the higher marginal tax rates would kick in when income is 
consolidated in one corporation.  Using multiple corporations to generate the 
same income could effectively fracture that income.  If structured properly, such 
an arrangement could prevent the higher tax rates from coming into play if the 
amount of income generated by each commonly controlled corporation did not 
exceed the $50,000 threshold that applies to the 15 percent marginal tax bracket.  
To guard against this hazard, all corporations under common control are treated 
as one for purposes of computing the income tax on their total income. 167
166  The JCT Staff proposal employs an existing definition of a service business.  Under 
that definition, a service business is one in which substantially all of the activities involve the 
performance of services in the fields of health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting, 
actuarial science, performing arts or consulting.  I.R.C. § 448(d)(2)(A).  
167 I.R.C. § 1561(a).
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The rule essentially denies the benefit associated with the use of a 
corporation to engage in a business.  In addition the rule acknowledges the 
economic realities behind the use of multiple corporations by a common owner.  
In a similar fashion, the proposal advanced above acknowledges the need to 
disregard the separate existence of the corporation when it is owned and 
controlled by someone who works for it.  In addition, the proposal takes an 
approach that prevents someone from using a corporation to minimize or 
eliminate a tax liability that would otherwise apply.
B. Personal Services Corporation
As a general rule, a corporation and its owner are two separate and 
distinct taxpaying units.  However, if the principal activity of the corporation is 
to perform personal services that are actually performed by a 10 percent owner, 
the Internal Revenue Service can reallocate items between the corporation and its 
owner, provided the arrangement was used to avoid tax.168  Any allocation made 
by the government must be necessary to prevent avoidance or evasion of federal 
income tax or to clearly reflect the income of the corporation or its employee-
owner.169 The statute effectively acknowledges that transactions between a 
corporation and someone who controls it may not occur on an arm’s length basis.  
To address this possibility, the statute enables the Internal Revenue Service to 
disregard the actual form of a transaction and to make reallocations that reflect 
the economic realities.
The proposal advanced in this article operates in a similar way.  It 
manifestly acknowledges that transactions between corporations and the owners 
who control them should not be taken at face value.  Thus, a payment that takes 
the form of a dividend should not be treated as such if it in fact constitutes 
disguised compensation for services rendered.  Moreover, even if a payment is 
made in the form of compensation, the amount paid may bear little or no 
resemblance to the economic realities.  Those economic realities may be difficult 
to determine in any situation where an individual is both and owner and an 
employee of a business.  Because the earnings of the business may represent both 
a return on the individual’s capital investment and a product of the individual’s 
labor, distinguishing one from the other may be arbitrary.  But any method used 
168 I.R.C. § 269A(b).  This rule does not authorize the Secretary to make a reallocation in 
the case under review.  First, because the statute limits the Secretary’s reallocation powers to 
cases involving the possible avoidance or evasion of federal income tax, the Secretary has no 
power to make a reallocation where the employment tax may be avoided or evaded.  Second, 
even if the power were available to address possible evasion or avoidance of the employment tax, 
the power could only be exercised when the corporation performs services for one other 
corporation, partnership or other entity.  As a result, the power cannot be applied to address the 
employee owner of a corporation that performs services for more than one corporation, 
partnership or other entity.
169 I.R.C. § 269A (a) (flush language).
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to make the distinction should be applied to in all cases.  The JCT Staff proposal 
uses an approach that appears to enjoy widespread appeal.  However, that 
proposal only applies its approach in the context of flow-through business 
entities.  The proposal described above merely extends that approach to closely 
held corporations, resulting in uniform standard.
C. Qualified Personal Service Corporations
As a general rule, the income of a corporation is taxed under a system of 
graduated marginal rates.  Under this system, the taxable income of a 
corporation falls into several layers, each one being subject to a (generally) higher 
rate that applied to the one below it.  In many cases, this system will cause at 
least a portion of the corporation’s income to be taxed at a rate as low as 15 
percent, even if the corporation may have enough income to put it in a higher 
rate bracket.  However, all of a corporation’s income is taxed at a flat 35 percent if 
the corporation is a “qualified personal service corporation.” 170 A corporation
acquires that status if substantially all of its activities involve the performance of 
services in the fields of health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting, 
actuarial science, performing arts, or consulting.171 The rule effectively prevents 
a corporation from enjoying the tax savings it would otherwise enjoy of the 
graduated rates were allowed to apply.  
In the absence of the rule, an individual in a high income bracket could 
divert a portion of his income to a corporation, where a lower tax might be 
imposed under the system of graduated marginal rates.  A flat 35 percent tax on 
all the income of the corporation reduces or eliminates any savings that might 
otherwise be gained by an individual using a corporation to operate a service 
business.  In a similar way, the modifications suggested to the JCT Staff proposal 
eliminate any employment tax savings that might otherwise be gained in 
situations where an individual operates a business through a corporation.  
D. Personal Holding Company Tax
The personal holding company tax represents an instance in which the 
law imposes a penalty when a corporation is used in a way to minimize or avoid 
a tax that would otherwise apply.  As explained above, the hallmark of the 
corporate tax system is the fact that profits are taxed first when earned by the 
corporation and again when distributed to shareholders.  However, the 
shareholder level tax will not come into play if the earnings are not distributed.  
The personal holding company tax operates to penalize a corporation in certain 
170 I.R.C. § 11(b)(2).
171 I.R.C. § 448(d)(2)(A).
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situations when profits are not distributed.  The amount of the penalty is equal to 
what the shareholders would have paid.172
The penalty tax can only apply if ownership of the corporation is 
concentrated.  Specifically, more than half of the value of the corporation’s stock 
must be owned by five or fewer individuals (and certain related parties) at any 
time during the last half of the tax year.173  If the stock ownership test is met, the 
second question is whether the corporation meets an income test, which requires 
that at least 60 percent of the corporation’s gross income (after certain 
adjustments) be passive type items, like dividends, interest, certain rents and 
royalties.174
Because the personal holding company tax provisions consider whether 
stock in the corporation is concentrated, they acknowledge the potential for 
closely held corporations to operate in undesirable ways that widely held 
corporations do not.  In this case, the provisions address the risk that (primarily) 
high income individuals would attempt to reduce their tax bill by transferring to 
a corporation income producing assets.  In the absence of the transfer, the income 
from such assets would be subject to tax at the high marginal rates that apply to 
the owner.  However, the tax bill could be much less if the income was taxable to 
a corporation where lower marginal tax rates would apply.  Furthermore, if the 
corporation never distributed the earnings, the shareholder tax that applies to 
dividends would never come into play.  
The personal holding company tax provisions essentially make it very 
unattractive to use a corporation as a vehicle to separate an individual from 
income that ought to be taxable to him.  Under the current set of rules, and under 
the proposal made by the JCT Staff, a corporation can operate as a vehicle that 
separates an individual from income that ought to be subject to employment tax 
as labor income.  The suggestions made in this article prevent that from 
happening.  However, they do so without operating as a penalty.  Instead, the 
suggestions merely require all individuals in economically similar situations to 
be subject to the same set of rules.  
E. Accumulated Earnings Tax
Even in situations where a corporation is not subject to the personal 
holding company tax, it may nevertheless face a penalty for failing to pay 
dividends to shareholders so as to prevent the shareholder level tax from 
172 I.R.C. § 541.  The penalty tax is not a substitute for the tax imposed on an actual 
dividend received by a shareholder from the corporation.  It is an additional levy.  Thus, even 
when a corporation pays the personal holding company tax, any later dividends paid by the 
corporation will be taxed to the shareholder as usual.
173 I.R.C. § 542(a)(2).  Attribution rules operate to cause a shareholder to constructively 
own shares actually owned by certain related parties.  I.R.C.  § 544(a).
174 I.R.C. §§ 542(a)(1); 543.
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applying to its earnings. 175  Specifically, the Internal Revenue Service can assess 
an accumulated earnings penalty tax on any corporation that accumulates 
earnings beyond the reasonable needs of the business. 176 This power can be 
exercises only in cases where there is evidence that the corporation was utilized 
to avoid or evade the tax that shareholders would have to pay on dividends.177
The accumulated earnings tax represents one way to restrain the ability of 
a corporation to control when the shareholder level tax comes into play.  The 
measure proposed by this article constitutes a different kind of mechanism 
directed at a similar activity.  Under current law and under the JCT Staff 
proposal, the employment tax liability of a corporation’s owner-employee could 
be controlled in undesirable ways.  That power is eliminated under the measure 
proposed in this paper, resulting in more uniform treatment of all employee -
owners whose economic situations are substantially the same.  
VI. Conclusion
Employment taxes account for a substantial portion of federal tax receipts.  
Yet the tax is assessed and collected under an outdated set of rules that is in 
desperate need of reform.  Not only are there gaps in the law, the rules 
themselves offer a number of opportunities for taxpayers to arrange their affairs 
so as to prevent the tax from coming into play when it otherwise would.
Prior to the enactment of the temporary tax cut on dividends, the defects 
in the employment tax scheme were severe enough.  However, after those tax 
cuts took effect, the defects have taken on greater significance because they 
appear to jeopardize the government’s ability to collect the employment tax from 
a substantial number of people.  Specifically, high income individuals who own 
and control corporations that employ them stand to save substantial amounts by 
substituting dividends for compensation they would have otherwise received 
from the business.  
As it stands, there does not appear to be much tangible evidence that the 
situation will change.  The JCT Staff has advanced a sensible proposal that serves 
as a very helpful framework for addressing the problem.  However, there does 
not seem to be much interest in adopting it or any other measure directed at 
addressing any of the well understood defects in the employment tax laws.  The 
last legislative measure was introduced during the Clinton administration.  By 
contrast, there have been repeated attempts by the Bush administration and 
others to make permanent the dividend tax cuts, which create new and hard-to-
resist opportunities for the rich to underpay employment tax by exploiting 
175 The tax does not apply if the following penalty taxes come into play:  the personal 
holding company tax imposed in section 542, the foreign personal holding company tax imposed 
by section 552, the passive foreign investment company tax imposed by section 1297.
176 See I.R.C. § 537 describing how to measure the reasonable needs of the business.
177 See I.R.C. § 533.
Working for Free
48
defects in the law.  Those defects are already long overdue for correction.  A very 
bad situation will only be made much, much worse if the dividend tax cuts are 
made permanent in the absence of legislation that eliminates the opportunity to 
substitute a dividend for compensation.  It doesn’t seem right that the rich 
should be able to get richer at the government’s expense by working for free.  
